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B. H. Macgillivray J. V. Sharp J. E. Strutt P. D. Hamilton 《Journal of Risk Research》2013,16(1):85-104
Risk management in the water utility sector is becoming increasingly explicit. However, due to the novelty and complexity of the discipline, utilities are encountering difficulties in defining and institutionalising their risk management processes. In response, the authors have developed a sector specific capability maturity methodology for benchmarking and improving risk management. The research, conducted in consultation with water utility practitioners, has distilled risk management into a coherent, process‐based framework. We identified eleven risk management processes, and eight key attributes with characterise the extent to which these processes are defined, controlled and institutionalised. Implementation of the model should enable utilities to more effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible and defensible decision making. 相似文献
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Timothy J. Richards William J. AllenderStephen F. Hamilton 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2012,30(1):50-57
When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative commodity price shocks; that is, whether commodity price volatility alters market power. We exploit recent volatility in food commodity prices over the period 2007-2010 to investigate how commodity price shocks translate into market power in two different vertically-structured food product industries: potatoes and fluid milk. For potatoes, we find both wholesale and retail market power decreases (increases) during periods of rising (falling) commodity prices. Moreover, price-cost margins widen a substantially greater degree in response to negative shocks than margins narrow in response to positive shocks, indicating that commodity price volatility increases market power. For fluid milk, we find that market power likewise declines during periods of rising commodity prices; however, market power does not significantly change during periods of falling commodity prices, suggesting that commodity price volatility decreases market power. 相似文献
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David B. Hamilton 《Journal of economic issues》2013,47(4):1531-1554
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Private company failure is a significant problem that is not fully addressed by existing research. This study develops a discriminant model from data on 107 private companies. The model predicts success and failure, based on six ratios obtained from the two immediately prior years' publicly available accounting reports. Based on a hold-out sample of 40 companies a prediction with 85% accuracy was achieved. This prediction was made one year ahead. The model indicates that the retained earnings/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, and shareholders funds/total liabilities ratios are the three major predictors of bankruptcy. Overall the model's coefficients are, as expected, substantially different to those of public company models. 相似文献
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A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool. 相似文献
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Hamilton Carl 《Review of World Economics》1986,122(2):358-364
Summary Given that a volume-defined VER is introduced on two differently priced varieties of a good,(i) the transfer of the VER-rent to the exporting country will cause imports of both varieties to fall,(ii) the relative price change in favour of the high cost variety counteracts this import fall and could in fact outweigh it,(iii) an ad valorem tariff restoring the original relative price of the two varieties would increase welfare and that welfare increase
could in fact outweigh the welfare loss due to the VER-transfer to the exporting country. 相似文献
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