Pathways to Success in M&A

For many if not most publicly traded companies, acquisition capabilities remain a critical component of sustainable longterm growth and profitability. And even as investors press companies to return excess capital through dividends and stock buybacks, the market continues to assign premium valuations to companies that earn above-average returns through a combination of internal investment and judicious acquisition spending.
This article begins by describing major challenges facing acquirers in the current business and regulatory environment. Then, after showing how M&A can be used to address strategic goals, the authors identify key elements in the M&A strategies of three highly successful companies: General Electric, Danaher, and Illinois Tool Works.     

Why are there glitches in product development?

Managers and scholars emphasize the importance of inter‐departmental integration to successful product development and emphasize the importance of product development capabilities to firm performance. Interdepartmental integration can increase shared knowledge; this in turn can reduce the severity and incidence of seemingly unnecessary and costly mistakes leading to more efficient and effective product development. This paper examines the sources of shared knowledge problems across functional and product‐based groups. Using interviews, product development plans, and time‐sheet data, we look at the underlying factors behind two sources of knowledge sharing problems: (1) a serial product development process (i.e. little or no face‐to‐face communications) and (2) ineffective use of integrating mechanisms because of sticky knowledge. For each problem source, we find two key causal factors. We discuss the problems, their factors, and the implications for management and theory.     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.