Ayres' Theory of Economic Progress: An Evaluation of Its Place in Economic Literature

A bstract . Clarence E. Ayres was unfortunate in certain of his critics; they missed the point. With the publication of a new edition of his classic. The Theory of Economic Progress , the time is ripe to re-evaluate Ayres' contributions. Ayres, like Thorstein Veblen before him, assimilated into economics the findings of other social science and humanistic disciplines, particularly anthropology. Both portrayed clearly the role in the economy of what Veblen called the matter-of-fact and Ayres 'technology,' The understanding of the role of technology and its extension in economic progress , implicit in Veblen, is made explicit by Ayres. Similarly the insight that certain entrepreneurial and financial activities which are ceremonial are non-essential to the technological process and hence dispensable is a contribution by Ayres to the one by Veblen that enables us to distinguish the scientific elements in economic theory from the theological.     

The First U.S. Food Stamp Program: An Example of Rent Seeking and Avoiding

Abstract . Rent seeking involves the wasteful expenses incurred to secure, acquire, or maintain a monopoly position. Rent avoiding involves the expenditures undertaken to avoid the imposition of rent-seeking costs. Each represents a social cost of Tullock rectangle loss in addition to the dead-weight or Harberger triangle loss that combined to form the Harberger-Tullock trapezoid social cost. The first Food Stamp Program in the United States came about through the rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding efforts of farmers, grocers, bankers, and other economic agents and did not lead to the promotion of social welfare. The evidence of these self-interested efforts was gleaned from articles in the New York Times and government documents. The first Food Stamp Program also fits the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler, Jordan, Peltzman and others, and it involved imposed costs on economic agents as the program evolved.     

Locational efficiency in a federal system

A number of recent studies have concluded that differing local government tax and expenditure packages necessarily create incentives for households to locate in a non-optimal fashion. This paper shows, on the contrary, that the locational equilibrium may be optimal. For example, if migration produces no congestion costs, then as long as localities tax the locationally-fixed commodity, land, the equilibrium will be optimal. In fact, there are only two reasons why non-optimality may result: local taxes may be distortionary (by taxing the mobile rather than immobile factor), or there may be non-internalized externalities.     

Profit,productivity, and profit-sharing

This study is an investigation of the effect of profit-sharing on labor productivity. When monitoring labor performance is costly for management, a regular wage/salary contract is insufficient to induce profit-maximizing behavior from the worker. The authors demonstrate that when this profit-maximizing behavior can be induced only through profit-sharing, a linear profit-sharing program will increase productivity and the welfare of both management and labor. The benefit from profit-sharing is increasing up to the point where the utility of additional income is offset by the negative utility of extraordinary effort (working harder or providing higher quality work). The income effect, i.e., the change in negative utility of extraordinary effort given a change in income, can potentially either increase or decrease the point at which the income-effort tradeoff-reaches zero.     

Selected Economic Analysis at the Antitrust Division: The Year in Review

Of the many activitiesof the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice, we havesummarized some that raise interestingeconomic issues. We describe recentimprovements in the methodology to beused in ``coordinated effects' analysisof mergers. We also discuss four casesbrought by the DOJ that raise issues ofmarket definition, the influence ofcommon partial ownership of competitors,and the effects of fringe suppliers inconstraining collusion by large firms.     

Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices

Liquidity in private asset markets is notoriously variable over time. Therefore, indices of changes in market value that are based on asset transaction prices will systematically reflect intertemporal differences in the ease of selling a property. We define and develop a concept of "constant-liquidity value" in the context of a model that is characterized by pro-cyclical volume of trading. We then present an econometric model that allows for estimation of both a standard transaction-based price index and a constant-liquidity index. Our application to the NCREIF database reveals that, in the case of institutional commercial real estate investment, constant-liquidity values tend to lead transaction-based and appraisal-based indices in time, and also to display greater volatility and cycle amplitude. The differences can be significant for strategic investment policy viewed from a mean-variance portfolio optimization perspective.