Benefits and barriers of telework: perception differences of human resources managers according to company's operations strategy

Telework as an integration of Information and Telecommunication Technologies with Human Resources management, means a new job organisation paradigm for companies working in the New Economy. However there are very few empirical studies that have analysed the perception differences of telework benefits and barriers in industrial and service companies. This paper contributes with empirical data to the relationship between the use of telework techniques and the implementation of this new work organisation with the company's operations strategy. The paper uses data from Spanish companies to test the relationship between innovation, employee training, and other production strategy performance parameters with the feasibility of telework adoption.     

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeoversand the source of their advantage. We show how the presenceof arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, sincearbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageurhas the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares.In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares andthe price they pay are determined endogenously. We also presentseveral empirical implications, including the relationship amongtrading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, andthe number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particulardeal.     

The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world

We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good governance, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. Firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide.     

The economic performance of the Russian economy in 2006 and a forecast for 2008–2010

This article examines the economic outcome of 2006 and builds a forecast for 2007–2010. The medium-term development risks of the Russian economy are analyzed.     

An analysis of option pricing under systematic consumption risk using GARCH

An issue in the pricing of contingent claims is whether to account for consumption risk. This is relevant for contingent claims on stock indices, such as the FTSE 100 share price index, as investor’s desire for smooth consumption is often used to explain risk premiums on stock market portfolios, but is not used to explain risk premiums on contingent claims themselves. This paper addresses this fundamental question by allowing for consumption in an economy to be correlated with returns. Daily data on the FTSE 100 share price index are used to compare three option pricing models: the Black–Scholes option pricing model, a GARCH (1, 1) model priced under a risk-neutral framework, and a GARCH (1, 1) model priced under systematic consumption risk. The findings are that accounting for systematic consumption risk only provides improved accuracy for in-the-money call options. When the correlation between consumption and returns increases, the model that accounts for consumption risk will produce lower call option prices than observed prices for in-the-money call options. These results combined imply that the potential consumption-related premium in the market for contingent claims is constant in the case of FTSE 100 index options.     

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITIQUE OF ARGYRIS AND SCHON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATION THEORY AND INTERVENTION

The purpose of this essay is to examine psychoanalytically Argyris and Schon's contributions to organization theory and intervention. The author focuses his attention on the problem of individual and organizational resistance to change in the light of Argyris and Schon's cognitive psychological assumptions about learning, reasoning, and effectiveness.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.