The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees

Leading academic and professional accountants have suggested that the crisis in auditing over the past few years may have had its origin in deregulation which allowed firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients, encouraging accounting firms to become more commercial. In this paper, we look at this issue in New Zealand which has the unique distinction of having separated two key forms of deregulation, namely advertising and solicitation, by 6 years. This allows us to separately examine the effect of each form of market competition on audit fees. We find that advertising is associated with increases in fees, not decreases, which suggests that quality-based advertising took place, and not price-based advertising. In contrast, solicitation corresponded with a general decrease in average fees for clients of the Big 8. We interpret this result as indicating an increase in competition among accounting firms. Our results suggest that there may be a much more complex relationship among market competition, advertising and solicitation, and fees than the arguments used to originally justify deregulation.     

Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.     

Mutual fund portfolio trading and investor flow

I estimate the extent to which mutual fund portfolio trading of securities is triggered by investor flows into and out of the funds, and find that this liquidity-induced portfolio trading activity is smaller than previously estimated by Edelen (1999). I obtain estimates from a much larger and broader sample of funds than Edelen’s (1999) sample. Portfolio managers of international funds trade a smaller fraction of investor flow than do those of domestic funds. Index funds invest a larger fraction. A funds’ usage of futures contracts does not have a statistically significant effect on how it trades in response to investor flows, but the unpredictability of investor flow weakly affects the trading response to flow.     

Bank competition efficiency in Europe: A frontier approach

There are numerous ways to indicate the degree of banking competition across countries. Antitrust authorities rely on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm while academics prefer price mark-ups (Lerner index) or correlations of input costs with output prices (H-statistic). These measures are not always strongly correlated within or across countries. Frontier efficiency analysis is used to devise an alternative indicator of competition and rank European countries by their dispersion from a “competition frontier”. The frontier is determined by how well payment and other costs explain variations in loan-deposit rate spread and non-interest activity revenues. Overall, differences in competition appear to be small.     

Correlation in corporate defaults: Contagion or conditional independence?

We revisit a method used by Das et al. (2007) (DDKS) who jointly test and reject a specification of firm default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption in intensity models of default. The method relies on a time change result for counting processes. With an almost identical set of default histories recorded by Moody’s in the period from 1982 to 2006, but using a different specification of the default intensity, we cannot reject the tests based on time change used in DDKS. We then note that the method proposed by DDKS is mainly a misspecification test in that it has very limited power in detecting violations of the doubly stochastic assumption. For example, it will not detect contagion which spreads through the explanatory variables “covariates” that determine the default intensities of individual firms. Therefore, we perform a different test using a Hawkes process alternative to see if firm-specific variables are affected by occurrences of defaults, but find no evidence of default contagion.     

Confidence,opinions of market efficiency,and investment behavior of finance professors

We identify finance professors’ opinions on the efficiency of the stock markets in the United States and assess whether their views on efficiency influence their investing behavior. Employing a survey distributed to over 4,000 professors, we obtain four main results. First, most professors believe the market is weak to semi-strong efficient. Second, twice as many professors passively invest than actively invest. Third, our respondents’ perceptions regarding market efficiency are almost entirely unrelated to their trading behavior. Fourth, the investment objectives of professors are, instead, largely driven by the same behavioral factor as for amateur investors–one's confidence in his own abilities to beat the market, independent of his opinion of market efficiency.     

The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns

Newly public companies must disclose significant risk factors in the offering prospectus. These disclosures are examples of “soft” or ambiguous information. Ambiguity models predict that investors will alter their portfolio weights and react to subsequent signals about such information. We test for these effects in a sample of 1,398 initial public offerings (IPOs) using word count ratios between soft and hard information as measures of ambiguity. We find a significant relationship between the soft information on risk and both initial and ex post measures of returns. These results support the view that soft information embeds ambiguity and that it influences investors’ portfolio choices.     

Anonymity,Stealth Trading,and the Information Content of Broker Identity

This paper examines whether the identity of a broker involved in transactions contains information. Using a sample of transactions from the Australian Stock Exchange—where broker identity is transparent—we provide evidence that consecutive buyer‐/seller‐initiated transactions by the same broker have a relatively high permanent price impact. This implies that broker identity conveys information to market participants, and that markets in which broker identity is disclosed are likely to be more efficient. We also find that medium‐sized trades by the same broker convey greater information than large and small trades, which is consistent with stealth trading by informed investors.     

Ownership Duration in the Residential Housing Market: The Influence of Structure,Tenure, Household and Neighborhood Factors

Turnover rates are important as determinants of the level of activity in housing related industries, in effecting housing market adjustments, and in revealing prices in illiquid, highly segmented, informationally inefficient housing markets. This study examines the relative influence of structure features, tenure, household characteristics and neighborhood factors on ownership turnover rates. The study exploits a Chicago database of just under 50,000 paired sales of attached housing units, with at least one of the sales occurring between 1992 and June of 2002. Within the framework of a Cox proportional hazard model, we focus on a number of factors affecting turnover rates, including whether the housing unit is owner-occupied or rented at the time of sale, price at the time of sale, unit size, age, location in a tax increment financing district, housing density, structure size, year of sale, and neighborhood within Chicago (by Community Area). Finding strong spatial segmentation in turnover (hazard) rates, we further examine the capacity of four sets of Census-derived variables to explain the spatial variation. The household characteristics offer decidedly the strongest power in explaining the segmentation. Results from the hazard model, combined with results from the analysis of spatial variation suggest a household life cycle model of variation in turnover rates.     

Investor perceptions of CEO successor selection in the wake of integrity and competence failures: A policy capturing study

Research summary : Drawing on theory about signaling, sensemaking, and the romance of leadership, we extend inquiry on investors' perceptions of CEO succession following misconduct. Whereas past studies have treated misconduct monolithically, we examine failures of integrity and competence separately. Using a policy capturing methodology that isolates investors' decision making from potential confounds, we find that, following an integrity failure, investors perceive outside and interim successors positively but inside successors negatively. Following a competence failure, investors perceive outside successors positively but are ambivalent toward inside and interim successors. Our findings indicate that whether an act of misconduct was an integrity failure or a competence failure, and what type of successor the firm chooses, are important considerations when using CEO succession as a means to restore investor confidence. Managerial summary: Business headlines regularly feature episodes of organizational misconduct, such as product safety problems, environmental violations, employee mistreatment, and securities lawsuits, and their aftermath. In such scenarios, shareholders demand answers from the people at the top, even if those people were not directly responsible for the problem. As a result, companies often fire the CEO as a means to restore investor confidence. Does this work? It depends on the type of misconduct and who is the CEO's successor. Following a competence failure, investors welcome the appointment of an outsider, but they are indifferent to inside and interim successors. Following an integrity failure, shareholders greet outside and interim CEO successors favorably while frowning on the promotion of insiders. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.