The development of a standardized student evaluation form

The original purpose of student evaluations was to provide feedback to the instructor to improve his/her teaching. However, the use of student evaluations in assessing promotion and tenure decisions is becoming increasingly apparent. Given that students represent one valuable source of evaluation data, the task involves gathering the information so as not to bias or influence the results. Thus, the objectives of this report are to discuss the methodology and pitfalls in the construction of a data collection instrument, and produce a “model” student evaluation form that may serve as the basis for establishing validity by having the academic community put it to the test.     

Do we really care about Biodiversity?

This paper addresses from an economic perspective the issue of global biodiversity conservation. It challenges the perception that the world really cares a great deal about biodiversity and is prepared to pay the full cost of maintaining this stock of natural capital. Despite the existence of a plethora of international agreements there still seems to be a global ‘deficit of care’ surrounding efforts to combat challenges such as those posed by global warming and biodiversity conservation. More light can be thrown on the degree of care by measuring both the actual expenditures and the stated willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation. However, actual expenditures are much lower than willingness to pay estimates recorded in the published literature. Using the criteria that the ‘right’ amount of conservation effort is one where the marginal economic benefits from conservation just equal the marginal costs of conservation, the paper explores the biodiversity conservation conundrum and concluded that, on the available evidence, the world does not care too much about this natural capital stock and bequests to future generations. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental study

Do people care about intentions – even when good intentions do not produce good results? In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions (the wage a firm decides to pay) and more modestly to distributional outcomes (the higher or lower wage actually received including the stochastic component). For example, workers who end up receiving medium wages respond much more positively when this resulted from the firm offering a high wage but bad luck lowered the worker's pay than when this resulted from the firm offering a low wage and good luck raised the pay.     

Intra-industry trade with multinational firms

Recent developments, including the analysis of firm-level adjustment to falling trade costs, have contributed to a revival of interest in intra-industry trade (IIT). Most empirical work still relies on the standard Grubel-Lloyd measure. This however refers only to international trade, disregarding income flows stimulated by repatriated profits of multinational firms. Given the overwhelming importance of the latter, this is a major shortcoming. This paper provides a guide to measurement and estimation of the determinants of bilateral IIT shares from the perspective of new trade theory with multinational firms. We develop an analytically solvable general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of investment costs, multinational activities and income flows from repatriated profits. We also discuss and quantify the bias of the Grubel-Lloyd index associated with repatriated profit flows of multinationals. Using bias-corrected versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index as the dependent variable, we demonstrate that the determinants motivated by our theoretical analysis offer important insights into variations in IIT shares.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Small-Firm Strategic Research Partnerships: The Case of Biotechnology

This paper provides an overview of the theoretical motivation and the empirical literature on small firm strategic alliances in biotechnology, an industry where these alliances have proliferated. We begin by examining the alliance strategy for knowledge-based small firms in general and then turn our attention to the case of biotech.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.