Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

Restructuring of the Hungarian Electricity Industry

Restructuring the monopolistic, state-owned, obsolete and polluting utility industries of post-socialist economies poses a challenge for the utility deregulation wave travelling around the world. Utility restructuring in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is unique from several perspectives, including the domination of foreign capital vs. national resources as the only feasible vehicle for a drastic change in the industry and the ambitious goals of harmonisation with the EU liberalisation schedule to accelerate accession. It is also widely expected that deregulation will help bring down world-record high energy intensities in these economies. Hungary has been the pioneer among economies in transition in unbundling, deregulating and privatising the utility industries and taking the first steps towards EU-conforming market liberalisation within less than half a decade. The first stages of privatisation and restructuring have been declared a success story in the Western media. However, what is a success story from a foreign perspective may be seen differently from other viewpoints. The article describes the process of utility restructuring in Hungary and examines its impact from the economic, environmental and policy perspectives. The article also compares the pioneer Hungarian deregulation with other CEE countries' restructuring of their energy sectors. However, the lessons to be learned from the Hungarian electricity industry restructuring are not only vital for other economies in transition but are often universally applicable.     

Liquidity risk and arbitrage pricing theory

Classical theories of financial markets assume an infinitely liquid market and that all traders act as price takers. This theory is a good approximation for highly liquid stocks, although even there it does not apply well for large traders or for modelling transaction costs. We extend the classical approach by formulating a new model that takes into account illiquidities. Our approach hypothesizes a stochastic supply curve for a securitys price as a function of trade size. This leads to a new definition of a self-financing trading strategy, additional restrictions on hedging strategies, and some interesting mathematical issues.Received: 1 November 2003, Mathematics Subject Classification: 60G44, 60H05, 90A09JEL Classification: G11, G12, G13Umut Çetin: This work was performed while Dr. Çetin was at the Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell UniversityPhilip Protter: Supported in part by NSF grant DMS-0202958 and NSA grant MDA-904-03-1-0092 The authors wish to thank M. Warachka and Kiseop Lee for helpful comments, as well as the anonymous referee and Associate Editor for numerous helpful suggestions, which have made this a much improved paper.     

Demand for the truth in principal–agent relationships

Consider the following puzzle: If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why don’t they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth? To answer this question, we model the shareholders–manager relationship as a principal–agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone observes the economic outcome. We show that the limited liability (LL) of the agent, defined as the agent’s feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for earnings management by the principal. Specifically, when the LL level is high (low), a contract that induces earnings management may be less (more) costly than a truth-revealing contract. This finding offers a new explanation of the demand for earnings management.     

Temporary open market operation on MBS repos: any foreshadowing of the financial crisis of 2008?

The financial crisis of 2008 was significantly influenced by housing, mortgage markets and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The Federal Reserve (Fed) conducts temporary open market operations on a daily basis and frequently uses repos on MBS. With this daily interaction with MBS, we examine whether any signal about the impending financial crisis could have been seen in the Fed’s temporary open market operations. We identify four anomalous events in MBS temporary open market operations and examine those events for signals of the financial crisis. We find nothing in the four events that would have provided signals of the financial crisis. Instead, the common feature of the four events is an unusually large supply of MBS made available to the Fed for those day’s temporary open market operations.     

铁路运输企业机车车辆运用动态分析、控制、考核模型研究

根据铁路运输企业实行资产经营责任制的要求 ,研究分析铁路运输企业的主要生产性资产机车车辆的投入产出关系 ,根据投入产出关系及机车车辆工作量的变动 ,动态控制与调节机车车辆投入量 ,按机车车辆运用效率考核运输生产指挥及管理人员的工作业绩。     

Trust Me! I am a European Central Banker

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross‐country data set that includes a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country's macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socioeconomic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust‐building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust‐building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long run.     

The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.     

Currency total return swaps: valuation and risk factor analysis

Abstract

Currency total return swaps (CTRS) are hybrid derivative instruments that allow us to simultaneously hedge against credit and currency risks. We develop a structural credit risk model to evaluate CTRS premia. An empirical test on a sample of 23,005 price observations from 59 underlying issuers yields an average percentage error of around 10%. This indicates that, beyond interest rate risk, firm-specific factors are major drivers of the variations in the valuation of these instruments. Regression analysis of residuals shows that exchange rate determinants account for up to 40% of model pricing errors, indicating that a currency risk premium affects the CTRS price significantly but only marginally, which confirms the prevalence of credit risk in the pricing of CTRS.     

An Analysis of Lockups in REIT IPOs

We analyze how the unique characteristics of real estate investment trusts (REITs) affect IPO lockup agreements from 1980 to 2006. The findings show that, unlike industrial IPOs, lockup periods for REIT IPOs do not cluster at 180 days, tend to cover longer periods, and vary over time. Our results support the commitment device hypothesis instead of the signaling hypothesis. That is, REIT managers tend to use lockup agreements to alleviate moral hazard problems and protect post-IPO investors rather than to send signals to investors. Finally, contrary to previous studies, we find no significant negative abnormal returns around the unlock date for the whole sample. The lack of aggressive sales by insiders and the fact that REITs are not backed by venture capitalists can explain our finding.