The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation

We investigate the incentives states have to provide insurance regulatory services in an efficient manner. Regulation of the insurance industry in the United States is unique, as it is conducted primarily at the state level whereas the majority of insurance sales are interstate. Consistent with predictions from the federalism literature, we find evidence of trans‐state externalities, as states with small domestic insurance markets are less efficient producers of insurance regulation and appear to allow states that choose to expend the greatest resources to regulate for them. In addition, states with more profitable domestic insurers are shown to export greater levels of regulation, suggesting extraterritorial regulation may erect modest barriers to entry. We find evidence of increasing economies of scale in the production of insurance regulation after controlling for these regulatory externalities.     

Investment Timing for Dynamic Business Expansion

We investigate the timing of business expansion. With an indefinite sequence of growth opportunities that have constant returns to scale, current investment neither displaces nor impairs future returns. In a dynamic setting with expansion restricted to a fraction of firm size, the endogenously determined cost of capital uniformly exceeds the value maximizing return threshold for expansion. Taking this into account, a manager accelerates investment to facilitate larger and more valuable future investments when earnings stochastically improve. This result is the opposite of deferral that the investment literature recommends due to irreversibility. This means that the managerial application of the cost of capital as an expansion hurdle rate is improperly conservative.     

Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.