Promotional Framing of Green Products: Mediating Role of Sale Proneness

Abstract

The impact of sales promotion in boosting short-term sales is well established in the literature. While there are ample studies on the impact of sales promotion on conventional products in western countries, there is very scant research on the effect of promotions on green products and almost nonexistence research in emerging economies. This research addresses this gap by doing a comparative assessment of economically equivalent bonus pack sales promotion and price discount sales promotions on green versus non-green products through two experiments designed as a 2 (green product motivation: hedonic vs. utilitarian) × 2 (promotional frame: price discount vs. bonus pack) × 2 (discount level: low vs. high) between-subjects study, and 2 ( product types: green, non-green/control) × 2(promotional frame: price discount, bonus pack) between-subjects study. This research further examines the mediating role of sale proneness in the purchase process. The findings of this research indicate that buyers' preferences for promotion are quite varied for the purchase of green versus non-green products, and the price discount increases sale proneness which exerts a negative impact on product purchase willingness. Accordingly, this study has some theoretical and practical implications.     

A taxonomy of information technology-enhanced pricing strategies

As a result of evolving technology, opportunities for innovative pricing strategies continuously emerge. The authors provide an updated taxonomy to show how such emerging strategies relate to recent technological advances. Specifically, they cite increased availability of information, enhanced reach, and expanded interactivity as three technological advancements and identify six pricing strategies enhanced by these factors. They also discuss the role of utility, prospect, range, and signaling theories for emerging pricing strategies, along with several applications and managerial implications.     

On Rybczynski's theorem in a setting of growth

This note re-examines earlier work by Petith on a two-sector economy in steady state growth facing constant world prices. It is shown that a steady state with higher saving propensities out of wages or profits has a higher output of the capital good per head, and greater exports of it compared to the no-trade equilibrium, if and only if the capital good is more capital-intensive. Petith's example yielding counterintuitive results is shown to be in error.     

Redesigning Regulation of Pensions and Other Financial Products

We observe that financial regulation is ever-growing, with thelatest area to experience increased supervisory attention beingpensions. Yet this has not made the financial world or consumerssafer, and for pensions in particular there are unexpected andundesired consequences. We explore the current policy approachto supervision, which is ‘bottom up’, i.e. assessmentand regulation of individual institutions, with the aim ofmakingthe financial system safe by making each institution safe. Weshow that this is both damaging (because it stifles innovation)and does not work (because risk will always be squeezed fromthe regulated institutions to the less regulated and less seen).Instead, we advocate a ‘top-down’ approach, whichfocuses on making the system safe first. We conclude that onceyou have made systems safe, detailed supervision of individualinstitutions is less necessary, thus reducing the burden ofsupervision. We believe that this approach will lead to a moresuitable and diverse treatment of different risks that willincrease both systemic and consumer safety. ‘If you haveten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the law’,Winston Churchill (1931). ‘The ultimate result of shieldingmen from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools’,Herbert Spencer (1891). Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: n.barr{at}lse.ac.uk; john_nugee{at}ssga.com     

The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman–Taylor estimates

This paper investigates the impact of group incentives on firms' performance. It shows that group incentive raises firms' performance. This result empirically validates the implication of the theoretical literature that performance‐related pay can potentially improve firms' performance, in the context of a developing country, and indicates the importance of group incentives in small firms. It also shows that partnership firms perform better than private limited companies and labour unions have a negative impact on firms' performance. It employs the Hausman–Taylor random effects estimator in order to isolate the effects of time‐invariant covariates and also to tackle potential endogeneity problem. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries

Transaction-cost politics views economic policy-making as a political process constrained by asymmetric information and limited commitment possibilities. This paper examines some implications of this perspective for less-developed countries (LDCs) considering policy reform. It emphasizes that success requires reform of the rules and institutions which govern the strategic interaction of the participants in the political game, and that reforms must cope with the special interests and asymmetric information which already exist. In this light, it examines some broad issues of the design of constitutions and institutions (definition and enforcement of property rights, control of inflation, and of government expenditures, federalism, and redistribution), as well as some specific issue of the design of organizations and incentives (problems posed by the interaction of multiple tasks and multiple interests, and their interaction with the limitations on auditing and administration that exists in many LDCs).     

Evaluating Recipes for Development Success

This article offers a provocative critique of the ability ofresearch on the impact of institutions on growth to offer immediateand practical recommendations for reforming and redesigninginstitutions in developing countries and transition economies.The literature traces the sources of growth to unalterable historicaland geographic features. It contains equally plausible recommendationsfor opposite courses of action. It is sometimes driven by fadsor recommends imitation of the latest success story. Some recommendationsare too vague or too general to constitute practical advice.The article suggests a Bayesian diagnostic procedure to identifythe causes of economic failure in an individual country as afirst step toward remedying the failure. JEL codes: O43, O17, O20, P30, P48