Effects of multilateral and preferential trade policy reform in Africa: The case of Uganda

Abstract

This paper estimates the effects on production, trade and economic welfare of current trade policy regimes throughout the world on Uganda relative to other economies. This will be a benchmark against which to examine various multilateral and preferential trade policy scenarios that might emerge over the next decade as part of the WTO's Doha Round and from the expected move later this decade towards Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union. The results suggest modest gains or worse for Uganda, in part because it already has low tariffs and ready preferential access to rich-country markets. Several important caveats to this type of analysis are stressed though, before drawing out some trade and policy implications for Uganda.     

Through New Eyes: Artificial Intelligence,Technological Unemployment,and Transhumanism in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Klara and the Sun

Journal of Business Ethics - Klara and the Sun, the latest novel by Nobel-prize winner Kazuo Ishiguro, forces one to reckon with one's own anxieties about the future of emerging technologies...     

Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information

We examine how risk-sharing is impacted by asymmetric information on the probability distribution of wealth. We define the optimal incentive compatible agreements in a two-agent model with two levels of wealth. When there is complete information on the probability of the different outcomes, the resulting allocation satisfies the mutuality principle (which states that everyone's final wealth depends only upon the aggregate wealth of the economy). This is no longer true when agents have private information regarding their probability distribution of wealth. Asymmetry of information (i) makes ex-post equal sharing unsustainable between two low-risk agents, and (ii) induces exchanges when agents have the same realization of wealth.     

Landscapes and territory-specific economic bases

The objective of this paper is to assess the potential of the landscape as a factor for regional development. Using the economic base theoretical framework, economic sectors are differentiated according to their alleged sensitivity to amenities. The empirical analysis clusters French counties on the basis of landscape physical attributes and economic sectors, then estimates the amenity-related basic employment multiplier in three study areas located in the Auvergne and Rhône-Alpes regions. Results tend to show that spending behavior is related to landscape type.     

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.     

Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

   Summary. A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from this flaw. We here estimate how frequent this paradox is for three candidate elections under the classical Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions, for different population sizes. The conditions under which this paradox occurs are also described, as well as the relationships with manipulations for a fixed number of voters. Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: January 12, 2000