Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort

Summary. We provide a characterization of participants' behavior in a contest or tournament where the marginal productivity of effort varies across contestants and individual productivity is private information. We then consider the optimal design of such a contest. We first analyze contestant behavior for the usual type of contest, where the highest output wins. Abilities need not be independently distributed. We demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium output function, that output is increasing in ability, and that marginal effort is increasing in ability, while effort decreases when the cost of effort increases. Next we consider the case where the highest output need not win, with independently distributed abilities. We analyze the contest designer's decisions in choosing contest rules optimal from her perspective. We show that the output produced, probability of winning, and contest designer's expected revenue are generally increasing in contestants' ability. We examine the relationship between the marginal cost of producing output and marginal utility per dollar of the net award for winning. Received: July 30, 1998; revised version: August 7, 2000     

Perceived marketing–sales relationship effectiveness: a matter of justice

There is a compelling need to improve the relationship between managers in marketing and sales departments. This paper argues that one critical way of enhancing individual managers’ perceptions of relationship effectiveness between these departments is to view the issue as a matter of justice and suggests that perceived marketing–sales relationship effectiveness is positively influenced by managers’ perceptions of organizational justice. Furthermore, it proposes that interfunctional communication has the potential to enhance the proposed positive effects of justice and hence needs to be considered and effectively managed when looking at marketing–sales relationship effectiveness. Data drawn from a survey of 203 marketing and sales managers in 38 consumer packaged goods companies are used to empirically test these predictions. The authors find that perceived sales–marketing relationship effectiveness is influenced by perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional justice. Greater interfunctional communication is found to further enhance the positive effects of distributive and procedural justice on perceived relationship effectiveness, but it does not contribute to the already strong positive effects of interactional justice. Furthermore, results reveal important differences in the effects of justice on perceived relationship effectiveness across the marketing and sales departments.     

Spontaneous visualization and concept evaluation

This paper proposes that customers often respond to brand extension concepts by visualizing the product. We call this process spontaneous visualization and suggest that it precedes concept evaluations. In two studies, we show that spontaneous visualization is enhanced by the fit between the parent brand and the extension category and by the ease with which the product category can be imagined. The appeal of the visualized image in turn determines whether visualization enhances or decreases concept evaluations. In addition, we find a stronger link between product evaluations and delayed choice when evaluations are based on visualization; evaluations based on visualization hence appear to be more “valid” in the sense of predicting subsequent behavior. Implications of these findings and ideas for future research are discussed.

The Nonparametric Approach to Applied Welfare Analysis

Changes in total surplus are traditional measures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizing individual and aggregate consumer demand data with individual quasilinear and homothetic utility functions. Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer welfare. For nonmarketed goods, we propose necessary and sufficient conditions on input market data for efficient production, i.e. production at minimum cost. Under these conditions we derive a cost function for the nonmarketed good, where producer surplus is the area above the marginal cost curve. We are greatful to helpful remarks and comments of the referees and the editor. The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through Grant BEC2002-2130, the Generalitat de Catlaunya, through Grant 2005SGR-00454 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA).     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX? THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

Despite the intensifying debate over the taxation of Internet commerce, the relevant issues have not been given a systematic treatment in the context of the literature on optimal taxation. This article presents such an analysis and investigates separately the taxation of business purchases of intermediate goods, the taxation of consumer purchases of final goods and services, and the various issues of administration and compliance costs as they apply to the development of E-commerce. The authors conclude that generally the optimal tax literature cannot be used in support of a blanket tax exemption for Internet purchases. Certain conditions could lead to the optimality of an exemption, but those conditions are not likely to be met in practice.     

Purchasing Power Parity and aggregation bias for a developing country: The case of Mexico

This paper investigates long-run Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between the US and Mexico. We use a panel of disaggregated price data between the US and Mexico with a long time series to look at two types of aggregation bias. The first is examined in Imbs et al. — which we refer to as estimator aggregation bias — and the second is put forth by Broda and Weinstein — hereafter, data aggregation bias. The findings indicate substantial estimator aggregation bias and data aggregation bias. Although estimates using aggregate data and imposing homogeneous coefficients provide little evidence of PPP, findings with disaggregated data and heterogeneous coefficient estimators offer strong support. The results also suggest the presence of small-sample bias as examined in Chen and Engel, but with little effect on the qualitative results. Tradable goods and non-tradable goods show little distinction in convergence rates. Estimated half-lives are lower under flexible than fixed exchange rates and indicate rapid convergence during the Mexican peso crisis.     

Increasing returns and the share economy

Under imperfect competition, profit maximization by firms results in the market price exceeding the marginal cost of production; Weitzman terms this “excess supply” Weitzman wishes to replicate in the cost function (in terms of labor) the properties of the revenue function (in terms of output), thus generating “excess demand” for labor. A revenue-sharing scheme will achieve this if and only if there are decreasing returns to scale. Hence increasing returns apparently play no role in Weitzman's analysis.