DURATION MOMENTS AND YIELD CURVE MOVEMENTS

In this paper we will analyze the relationship between the value and duration moments of a cash flow and movements in the yield curve. We will show that for changes in the yield curve which can be related to tⁿ , the 1st order changes in the net present value of a cash flow are linearly dependent on the n + lth duration moments, and that the 2nd order changes are dependent on the sum of duration moments of order 2 n + 1 and 2 n + 2. We will use this relationship to tilt tracking portfolios so as to protect them against specific changes in the yield curve.     

The financing decisions of REITs: The case of warrant extensions

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions by REITs. As predicted by option pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to these extensions. The stocks of REITs making the extension announcements experience average abnormal returns that are not significantly different from zero. Thus, total firm value appears to increase, with the gains accruing primarily to the warrantholders.     

Contrarian Investment in the Dutch Stock Market

The efficient markets hypothesis states that at any times security prices fully reflect all available information. Contrarian investment strategies do not recognize the efficiency of capital markets. They call for buying undervalued stocks, i.e. stocks with a low price relative to their fundamentals. The idea behind such a strategy is to take advantage of the extrapolation behaviour of naive investors. Using a fresh and extensive data set from the Dutch stock market, we found that these strategies yield an outperformance without a higher risk. Our results make it hard to maintain the efficient market hypothesis.     

Information styles of marketing and R&D personnel during technological product innovation projects

Abstract The research question in the present article can be phrased in the following way: what are the elements which influence the perception of the utility of information received from another function? A field study research has been conducted in 40 Belgian companies. In each company, we have studied two on-going innovation projects (one planning project, one development project). Crossfunctional communication behaviours at the R&D/marketing interface have been measured by means of mailed structured questionnaires. Three-hundred and eighty-six questionnaires have been returned. The data analyses show that there are four underlying information dimensions, i.e. the perceived relevance, the perceived comprehensibility, the perceived novelty and the perceived credibility of information. We also discuss some contingency variables (function of the message receiver, stage in the innovation process) that might moderate the impact of these dimensions. It will be shown that the interaction between source and receiver has a significant impact on the perceived credibility, the perceived comprehensibility and the perceived novelty of the received information.     

Negotiation support using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is a flexible methodology for systematically studying strategic conflicts in the real world, and is therefore a natural tool for negotiation support. The basic definitions underlying the graph model are reviewed, and the techniques for analysis and interpretation are discussed. The modeling and analysis of a case study, an international trade negotiation concerning the export of Canadian softwood lumber to the United States, are used to demonstrate the practical application of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a negotiation support tool. The modeling and analysis is carried out using the GMCR software system. The ability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to provide insights and advice to negotiators is emphasized.     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.