Agency Structure and Firm Culture: OSHA, EPA, and the Steel Industry

We compare models of Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcementand compliance for steel plants during the 1980s. We find thatOSHA and EPA respond similarly to plant-level compliance andmeasures of hazardousness, but differently to firm-level complianceand risks of plant closing, and we relate the differences tothe agencies' differing organizational structures. Plant-levelcompliance is affected by enforcement pressure, compliance costs,and the firm's overall compliance behavior in similar ways forthe two regulatory areas, but environmental compliance was alsosensitive to plant size and risk of closing. Finally, we findthat the likelihood that a plant was in compliance with oneagency seemed at most weakly related to whether it was in compliancewith the other, but that plants likely to receive enforcementattention from one agency were also more likely to receive enforcementattention from the other agency.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence

Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty in Mexico

We estimate an augmented multivariate GARCH-M model of inflation and output growth for Mexico at business cycle frequencies. The main findings are: (1) inflation uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on growth; (2) once the effect of inflation uncertainty is accounted for, lagged inflation does not have a direct negative effect on output growth; (3) However as predicted by Friedman and Ball, higher average inflation raises inflation uncertainty, and the overall net effect of average inflation on output growth in Mexico is negative. That is, average inflation is harmful to Mexican growth due to its impact on inflation uncertainty. (4) The Mexican Presidential election cycle significantly raises inflation uncertainty both during the year of the election and the year following the election which has correspondingly negative effects on output growth.     

Disequilibrium dynamics in a simple macroeconomic model

The dynamic behavior of a simple macroeconomic disequilibrium model is analyzed in which consumers' changes in money holdings constitute the dynamic link between any two periods. It is shown that, under constant government consumption, a constant production function (no investment), and fixed prices and wages, stationary states of Keynesian unemployment are stable whereas those of repressed inflation are globally unstable. Possibilities of unemployment and output cycles are indicated for fixed wages as well as for some very simple class of wage and price adjustment mechanisms.     

Financial liberalization,financial sector development and growth: Evidence from Malaysia

The objective of this paper is to examine whether financial development leads to economic growth or vice versa in the small open economy of Malaysia. Using time series data from 1960 to 2001, we conduct cointegration and causality tests to assess the finance-growth link by taking the real interest rate and financial repression into account. The empirical evidence suggests that financial liberalization, through removing the repressionist policies, has a favorable effect in stimulating financial sector development. Financial depth and economic development are positively related; but contrary to the conventional findings, our results support Robinson's view that output growth leads to higher financial depth in the long-run.     

KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS AND THE SHORTAGE OF DONORS: IS A MARKET THE ANSWER?

This article examines the problem of kidney shortages for transplant in the United States. Following a study by Kaserman and Barnett, we reexamine the viability of allowing a market for cadaveric kidneys and estimate the implied equilibrium price based on our survey responses. In sharp contrast to the findings of Kaserman and Barnett, we estimate that a market equilibrium price for cadaveric kidneys may be prohibitively high. Consequently, we support other policy alternatives to increase supply, particularly presumed consent and mandated choice. Our findings also highlight the importance of obtaining data through experiments, rather than a survey, to estimate the impact of financial incentives. ( JEL I18, I12, I00)     

Experimental evidence of gender effects in arbitration decisions

The study investigates arbitrator gender and arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of 146 arbitrators rendered on a hypothetical sexual harassment case. Gender was not found to have a statistically significant effect on the decisions examined. However, other characteristics of the arbitrator—level of experience and level of education—were found to influence the arbitral decision.