DANGERS OF CAPITAL FORBEARANCE: THE CASE OF THE FSLIC AND "ZOMBIE" S&Ls

This paper portrays Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) forbearance and congressional unwillingness to increase the FSLIC's human or capital resources to the size necessary to handle developing economic insolvencies as a joint policy crime that has served to bifurcate the savings and loan industry into the living and the living dead. As agents for the taxpayer, Congress and the FSLIC have assumed too much discretion and have chosen to exercise that discretion myopically. An agent has a duty to represent its principal's economic interests more effectively than this. The FSLIC's policy touchstone should be to negotiate and enforce the same kind of covenant provisions that a prudent private guarantor would require.     

Municipal Bond Demand Premiums and Bond Price Volatility: A Note

The behavior of different components of municipal bond yields may have a significant impact upon bond price behavior. Specifically, demand premiums created by banks may stabilize bond yields in some maturity ranges but not in others; for example, short-term municipals may be stabilized but not long-term. This research implies that bank demand behavior may create demand premiums that stabilize prices of short-term municipal bonds relative to those of Treasury bonds of like maturity. While this implication is inconsistent with the residual theory of bank demand, it is consistent with the tax-shield theory attributed to Hendershott and Koch [3, 4].     

Is Common Stock Obsolete?

Agency theory rests on a well-defined relationship between shareholders and managers. That relationship is examined and found to be a poorly denned state-contingent contract. The implications of that finding, and the existence of only a weak market for managers, lead to the conclusion that the traditional assumptions about the rights of shareholders no longer apply and that common stock (ordinary share capital) is obsolete.     

Federal Deposit Insurance,Regulatory Policy,and Optimal Bank Capital*

This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk-taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.     

The Impact of Federal Interest Rate Regulations on the Small Saver: Further Evidence

This paper provides further evidence on the distributional impact of interest rate ceilings on the small saver. Cross-section data from the 1977 Consumer Credit Survey was used to estimate the implicit losses imposed on different income classes by government regulations. Our findings generally support earlier studies which found the implicit burden to be regressive among income classes. However, the degree of regressivity showed a marked decrease since 1970. These results may be explained by portfolio adjustments of households and financial innovations in response to deposit rate ceilings and accelerating inflation during the 1970s.     

A Tale of Two Rigidities: Sticky Prices in a Sticky‐Information Environment

Macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations allow for comparisons with macro and micro empirical evidence. This paper proposes a model wherein firms: (i) acquire information infrequently, generating sticky information ( Mankiw and Reis 2002 ) and (ii) face menu costs, producing state‐dependent sticky prices. I estimate parameters via indirect inference and show that under considerable real rigidity, sticky prices in a sticky‐information environment are consistent with micro and macro evidence. Sticky prices not only help match micro data on price changes’ size and durations between adjustments; they also improve the model's fit with the macro data, as embodied in an empirical Phillips curve.