Learning with noiseless information and payoff-relevant signals

Summary. In models of active learning or experimentation, agents modify their actions to affect the distribution of a signal that provides information about future payoffs. A standard result in the experimentation literature is that agents experiment, if at all, to increase information. This finding is a direct consequence of Blackwell's theorem: one experiment is more informative than another if and only if all expected utility maximizers prefer to observe the first. Blackwell's theorem presupposes, however, that the observed signal only conveys information and does not directly affect future payoffs. Often, however, signals are directly payoff relevant, a phenomenon that we call signal dependence. For example, if a firm is uncertain about its demand and uses today's sales as a signal of tomorrow's demand, then that signal may also directly affect tomorrow's profit if the good is durable or if consumers form consumption habits. Datta, Mirman and Schlee [9] and Bertocchi and Spagat [4] show that, if the signal is payoff relevant, experimentation may indeed reduce information. Here we show that, despite the inapplicability of Blackwell's Theorem, agents always experiment to increase information if the information structure is noiseless: given the true value of the unknown parameter, the signal realization is deterministic. We then apply our framework to analyze Lazear's [16] model of retail clearance sales, a model with both signal dependence and noiseless information. Received: February 19, 1999; revised version: August 11, 1999     

How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators

This paper studies the impact of technological change and regulatory competition on governmental efforts to generate rents for banks in two stylized regulatory environments. In the first environment, incentive-conflicted regulators attempt to create rents by restricting the size and scope of individual banking organizations. In the second, rents come from efforts to supply deposit guarantees to troubled banks. In both cases, innovations in financial technology and in competing domestic and offshore regulatory arrangements make the costs of delivering rents to banks more transparent to taxpayers and encourage customers to push rent-dependent banking systems into crisis. This analysis portrays the banking crises that have roiled world markets in recent years as information-producing events that identify and discredit inefficient strategies of regulating banking markets.     

Housing Finance GSEs: Who Gets the Subsidy?

Taxpayer subsidies that flow toward housing-finance GSEs are implicit in nature. This makes the size and distribution of subsidy values hard to measure directly. An array of indirect analyses indicates that incentive-conflicted GSE managers can and do extract substantial annual subsidies for GSE stockholders. Currently, stockholders are allowed to encourage managers to exploit taxpayers by tying incentive compensation implicitly to increases in the discounted present value of expected future subsidies. To counteract this inappropriate incentive, managers should be made accountable to taxpayers for returning all compensation that can be fairly attributed to increases in subsidies captured by GSE stockholders.     

Enhancing organizational sensemaking: An examination of the interactive effects of sales capabilities and marketing dashboards

Current marketing research highlights the direct effects of marketing resources on firm performance. Few studies, however, examine how such resources interact with one another and contribute to the strategic actions, such as sensemaking. In this study, we investigate how sales capabilities and performance monitoring via marketing dashboards influence a firm's sensemaking. The results from our study suggest that sales capability and the use of marketing dashboards not only contribute directly, but also have an interactive effect, highlighting the importance of integrating both sales and marketing operations. Further, we find evidence that sensemaking influences cost control and enhances customer relationship performance, suggesting that sensemaking has the potential to simultaneously impact both cost efficiency and growth.     

Bank accounting conservatism and bank loan pricing

This paper studies the effects of bank accounting conservatism on the pricing of syndicated bank loans. We provide evidence that banks timelier in loss recognition charge higher spreads. We go onto consider what happens to the relationship between spreads and timeliness in loss recognition during the financial crisis. During the crisis, banks timelier in loss recognition increase their spreads to a lesser extent than banks less timely in loss recognition. These findings are broadly consistent with the argument that conditional accounting conservatism serves a governance role. The policy implication is that banks timelier in loss recognition exhibit more prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour.     

Bill Waters on Schumpeter

Bill Waters’ dissertation “Entrepreneurship, Dualism, and Causality: An Appreciation of the Work of Joseph A. Schumpeter” completed at Georgetown University in 1952 is significant for two reasons. The first is clear enough from the very beginning: Schumpeter and the entrepreneur. The other comes to light through hindsight: Bill brings to bear an understanding of economic affairs which is personalist rather than individualist or collectivist in nature. In short, Bill sees as the main activating force in economic affairs not the impersonal forces of the market, not the central planning board, but the person who innovates, who acts bolding in economic affairs, the banker who creates credit, and the capitalist who supplies old funds. Thus the Waters’ dissertation says much not only about Schumpeter but also about Bill himself. His dissertation is his only book-length publication.     

Biodiversity and geography

We combine a new economic geography model of agglomeration and dispersion of economic activity with an ecological–economic model of species diversity to examine optimal policies of biodiversity conservation in a two-region world. Species diversity is inevitably impaired by anthropogenic impact. Thus, the economic and ecological systems compete for space and the question arises as to how this conflict should be resolved. The decisive parameters of the model are related to biological diversity (endemism vs. redundancy of species) and the patterns of economic geography (centrifugal vs. centripetal forces). As regards the choice of environmental-policy instruments, it is shown that Pigouvian taxes do not always establish the optimal allocation.     

A crisis of leadership: towards an anti-sovereign ethics of organisation

A common reaction to crises experienced within or brought about by business is to identify a corollary ‘crisis of leadership’ and to call for better (stronger, more thoughtful or, indeed, more ethical and responsible) leaders. This paper supports the idea that there is a crisis of leadership – but interprets it quite differently. Specifically, I argue that the most ethically debilitating crisis is the fact that we look to leadership to solve organisational ethical ills. There is, I argue, a pressing need to conceptualise a business ethics that is not constrained by the straitjacket of official hierarchy – a need to denaturalise ‘leadership’ as the normal or rightful locus of ethical regulation and renewal in business organisation. To this end, I explore a Levinasian ethico-politics of responsibility and proximity as the basis of an alternative, anti-sovereign, ethics of organisation.     

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability

This study examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability. U.K. domestic standards are considered very similar to IFRS, suggesting any capital market benefits observed for U.K.‐domiciled firms are more likely attributable to improvements in comparability (i.e., better precision of across‐firm information) than to changes in information quality specific to the firm (i.e., core information quality). If IFRS adoption improves financial statement comparability, we predict this should reduce insiders' ability to benefit from private information. Consistent with these expectations, we find that abnormal returns to insider purchases ― used to proxy for private information ― are reduced following IFRS adoption. Similar results obtain across numerous subsamples and proxies used to isolate IFRS effects attributable to comparability. Together, the findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption improving comparability and thus leading to capital market benefits by reducing insiders' ability to exploit private information.