The paper deals with an entrepreneur who operates in imperfect capital markets, making rational decisions about productive and financial investment. Using the economic rule that the allocation of assets between productive and financial purposes is carried out according to the equality of the marginal productivity and the marginal factor costs of debt, the paper analyses the factors which determine the size of the firm, the size of debt, and the optimal dynamic path. 相似文献
We provide a classification of club models and relate differences in implications to differences in assumptions. Then we address two main controversies - one concerning the optimality of market provisions of public goods and their optimality and the other concerning the desirability of segregation. 相似文献
A general equilibrium model of an economy with cities, farms and free migration of population is constructed. The cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale. They also produce housing and a local public good. Two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other. An area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement. The economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area's net export of goods and resources. Local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value. This state is proved to be a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of the economy. It is then proved that beside Piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently, are taxes on land rents. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary, and local authorities can be fully autonomous. If the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas, those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only. 相似文献
Why do some new ventures succeed while others fail? What is the essence of entrepreneurship? Who is most likely to become a successful entrepreneur and why? How do entrepreneurs make decisions? What market, regulatory, and organizational environments foster the most successful entrepreneurial activities? Entrepreneurship research is plagued by these and other fundamental unanswered questions, for which there does not exist a cohesive explanatory, predictive, or normative theory. In this article we identify major challenges for entrepreneurship theory development, and offer insights into promising directions for future research. Our conclusion suggests that it may be too ambitious to expect a complete and robust theory due to the interdisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship. However, we show that by integrating perspectives and by applying analytic, empirical and experimental tools from a range of fields, some of the fundamental questions can be answered. 相似文献
This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity and derive several new cross-sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies. In addition, we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures. 相似文献
This paper examines the role of software piracy in digital platforms where a platform provider makes a decision of how much software to produce in-house and how much to outsource from a third-party software provider. Using a vertical differentiation model, we theoretically investigate how piracy influences the software outsourcing decision. We find that when piracy is intermediate, the loss in in-house software profits due to piracy outweighs the loss in licensing fee profits. As a result, an increase in piracy leads to more outsourcing. However, when piracy is high, it becomes too expensive for the platform provider to subsidize the software provider, resulting in a decrease in outsourcing. Moreover, when software variety is also endogenously chosen by firms, the platform provider’s incentive to develop software variety in-house depends not only on the return from software profits but also on the return from hardware profits. Under such a situation, an increase in piracy always leads to less outsourcing and less total software variety. To provide additional insights on the outsourcing decision, we conduct empirical analyses using data from the U.S. handheld video game market between 2004 and 2012. This market is a classical two-sided market, dominated by two handheld platforms (Nintendo DS and Sony PlayStation Portable) and is known to have suffered from software piracy significantly. Our regression results show that in this market, piracy increases outsourcing but has no effect on the total software variety.
Marketing Letters - Based on new data, we replicate Mahajan et al.’s (1990) paper on adopter categories and Goldenberg et al.’s (2002) paper on saddles and offer explanations and... 相似文献