Big data from dynamic pricing: A smart approach to tourism demand forecasting

Suppliers of tourist services continuously generate big data on ask prices. We suggest using this information, in the form of a price index, to forecast the occupation rates for virtually any time-space frame, provided that there are a sufficient number of decision makers “sharing” their pricing strategies on the web. Our approach guarantees great transparency and replicability, as big data from OTAs do not depend on search interfaces and can facilitate intelligent interactions between the territory and its inhabitants, thus providing a starting point for a smart decision-making process. We show that it is possible to obtain a noticeable increase in the forecasting performance by including the proposed leading indicator (price index) into the set of explanatory variables, even with very simple model specifications. Our findings offer a new research direction in the field of tourism demand forecasting leveraging on big data from the supply side.     

Time-to-market in vertically differentiated industries

This paper analyzes the optimal time to introduce a new product in a vertical differentiated market when the delay between innovation and market opening can be shortened through investments whose costs increase, the shorter the desired delay. The timing process is affected by the trade-off between being first and getting monopoly profits, and postponing entry for reducing time-to-market costs. We study the balance of these forces and how this balance is influenced by market structure. In our model, it is possible a priori to observe at the optimal solution both a quality-upgrading equilibrium (first entering the market with the low quality good and then marketing the high quality variant) and quality-downgrading equilibrium (first entering the market with the high quality good and then marketing the low quality variant) while in the existing published literature a quality-upgrading equilibrium is always observed.     

Vertical integration,foreclosure, and productive efficiency

We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.     

FDI and Growth: What Cross‐country Industry Data Say

The theoretical literature has discussed different channels through which foreign direct investments (FDI) promote host country’s economic growth, but empirical analyses have so far been rather inconclusive. In this paper, exploiting the information of a disaggregated data set on a panel of 14 manufacturing sectors for (a sample of) developed and developing countries over the period 1992–2004, we are able to provide robust evidence on the positive and statistically significant growth effect of FDI in recipient countries. Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger in capital‐intensive and technologically advanced sectors. The growth enhancing effect comes primarily from an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) and from factors accumulation. Our results are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of economic growth and to controlling for potential endogeneity.     

FROM EXOGENOUS TO ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC NETWORKS: INTERNET APPLICATIONS

Abstract.  Economic agents' behaviour is affected by their position in a network, either exogenous or endogenous, in which they interact with a sub-set of neighbours only. The network's links, which may be generated by vertical and/or horizontal relations, or by more complex morphologies, may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates. Moreover, networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies; the problem of access and interconnection, particularly relevant in the Internet, is perhaps the best example. A two-way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous: those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links and R & D networks.     

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.     

TRUST AND VIRTUAL DISTRICTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE MILAN INTERNET EXCHANGE

Peering decisions between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) contain substantial non‐measurable aspects requiring trust and informal cooperation among peering partners. We study whether virtual districts are observed between Internet peers. Our empirical analysis of the bilateral peering decisions at the Milan Internet Exchange confirms that these decisions are significantly influenced by: travel time either between ISPs' headquarters or towards the exchange—a proxy for distance, bandwidth—a proxy for size, and European connectivity. Proximity still plays a role in reducing the transaction costs of monitoring and punishing deviant behavior within an industry where trust is essential for Internet universal connectivity.     

A note on the effects of market power distribution in Cordella and Gabszewicz's Ricardian model

We argue that it is the distribution of market power among agents, rather than the use of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarky. By applying Baldwin (1948) monopoly equilibrium concepts to the general equilibrium with imperfect competition model analyzed by Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997), we show that the monopoly equilibrium outcome Pareto dominates the oligopoly one. As a consequence, economic efficiency is higher when market power is concentrated in one agent than when it is evenly distributed among few agents.