Time-to-market in vertically differentiated industries

This paper analyzes the optimal time to introduce a new product in a vertical differentiated market when the delay between innovation and market opening can be shortened through investments whose costs increase, the shorter the desired delay. The timing process is affected by the trade-off between being first and getting monopoly profits, and postponing entry for reducing time-to-market costs. We study the balance of these forces and how this balance is influenced by market structure. In our model, it is possible a priori to observe at the optimal solution both a quality-upgrading equilibrium (first entering the market with the low quality good and then marketing the high quality variant) and quality-downgrading equilibrium (first entering the market with the high quality good and then marketing the low quality variant) while in the existing published literature a quality-upgrading equilibrium is always observed.     

Vertical integration,foreclosure, and productive efficiency

We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.     

FROM EXOGENOUS TO ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC NETWORKS: INTERNET APPLICATIONS

Abstract.  Economic agents' behaviour is affected by their position in a network, either exogenous or endogenous, in which they interact with a sub-set of neighbours only. The network's links, which may be generated by vertical and/or horizontal relations, or by more complex morphologies, may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates. Moreover, networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies; the problem of access and interconnection, particularly relevant in the Internet, is perhaps the best example. A two-way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous: those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links and R & D networks.     

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.     

A note on the effects of market power distribution in Cordella and Gabszewicz's Ricardian model

We argue that it is the distribution of market power among agents, rather than the use of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarky. By applying Baldwin (1948) monopoly equilibrium concepts to the general equilibrium with imperfect competition model analyzed by Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997), we show that the monopoly equilibrium outcome Pareto dominates the oligopoly one. As a consequence, economic efficiency is higher when market power is concentrated in one agent than when it is evenly distributed among few agents.     

Identification in Structural Vector Autoregressive Models with Structural Changes,with an Application to US Monetary Policy

A growing line of research makes use of structural changes and different volatility regimes found in the data in a constructive manner to improve the identification of structural parameters in structural vector autoregressions (SVARs). A standard assumption made in the literature is that the reduced form unconditional error covariance matrix varies while the structural parameters remain constant. Under this hypothesis, it is possible to identify the SVAR without needing to resort to additional restrictions. With macroeconomic data, the assumption that the transmission mechanism of the shocks does not vary across volatility regimes is debatable. We derive novel necessary and sufficient rank conditions for local identification of SVARs, where both the error covariance matrix and the structural parameters are allowed to change across volatility regimes. Our approach generalizes the existing literature on ‘identification through changes in volatility’ to a broader framework and opens up interesting possibilities for practitioners. An empirical illustration focuses on a small monetary policy SVAR of the US economy and suggests that monetary policy has become more effective at stabilizing the economy since the 1980s.     

Are Commodity Prices Driven by Fundamentals?

Physical scarcity is hardly sufficient to explain commodity price swings. However, despite of clues of commodity market inefficiency in the last decade, excess volatility in commodity markets emerges only under strong assumptions. When we allow for non‐stationarity in commodity prices and time variation in commodity‐specific risk premia, evidence of commodity market inefficiency becomes significantly weaker. Moreover, there is some evidence of commodity‐specific regime changes in commodity markets, with negligible or even positive correlation between efficiency and market liquidity.     

Household financial vulnerability: An empirical analysis

Using survey data, we investigate household financial distress. Specifically, we propose an indicator of financial vulnerability to jointly analyse different features of household financial distress, analysing its socio-demographic and economic determinants. A total number of 3102 Italian households make up the sample.The empirical analysis highlights that for the median level of the financial vulnerability index households already exhibit some important symptoms of financial vulnerability, such as problems in getting to the end of the month or an inability to face unexpected expenses. As regards the determinants of the financial vulnerability index, three findings need to be pointed out. First, the level of debt servicing is positively related to financial vulnerability and the effect is stronger for households holding unsecured debt, i.e. consumer credit. Second, financial vulnerability also increases for impulsive individuals, who may adopt impatient, short-sighted behaviour patterns which make it difficult for them to be fully aware of the consequences of their financial and spending decisions. Third, a higher level of education helps to reduce financial fragility.