Corporate governance and the probability of default

We employ Merton's probability of default as a continuous ex‐ante measure of the likelihood of firm failure and dynamic panel generalised method of moments to better characterise the relationship between corporate governance and the chance of default. In doing so, we overcome limitations of discrete proxies widely used in previous studies and more completely account for endogeneity issues permeating this area of research. While initial testing designed to facilitate comparison with previous studies suggests a significant relationship between the probability of default and executive pay, board structure and ownership structure, once endogeneity concerns are accounted for, no such relationship remains.     

Volatility spill-overs in commodity spot prices: New empirical results

The classical rational expectations model of commodity markets implies that expected spot price risk is an explanatory variable in spot price regressions; and also that inventory carryover, which is reduced by a larger price variance, creates autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic processes in spot prices. In order to falsify/verify this theory, it has typically been assumed that the square root of the conditional variance of spot prices, a proxy for spot price risk, enters the conditional mean function of spot prices. Based on this simple representation, a typical but counter intuitive outcome has been that spot price risk has an insignificant impact on spot prices, see, e.g., Beck (Beck, S., 1993. A Rational Expectations Model of Time Varying Risk Premia in Commodities Futures Markets: Theory and Evidence. International Economic Review 34, 149–168, Beck, S., 2001. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Commodity Spot Prices. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16, 115–132). In this paper, we propose an alternative functional relationship (from GARCH(1,1) to GARCH(1,1)-AR(m)) between spot price risk and spot prices that is fully supported by the classical rational expectations model, and based on this new representation we are able to provide stronger empirical support for Muth's rational expectation theory.     

Lagrangean conditions for consumers with nonrepresentable preferences

A Lagrangian characterization of the solutions of the consumer problem is provided when preferences are not representable by a continuous utility function.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.