A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Dynamic scoring: Alternative financing schemes

Neoclassical growth models predict that reductions in capital or labor income tax rates are expansionary when lump-sum transfers are used to balance the government budget. This paper explores the consequences of bond-financed tax reductions that bring forth a range of possible offsetting policies, including future government consumption, capital tax rates, or labor tax rates. Through the resulting intertemporal distortions, current tax cuts can be expansionary or contractionary. The paper also finds that more aggressive responses of offsetting policies to debt engender less debt accumulation and less costly tax cuts.     

The Contingent Value of Responsive and Proactive Market Orientations for New Product Program Performance*

While the benefits of being market oriented are largely accepted, a group of scholars and managers remain skeptical. Marketing scholars have sought to counter the criticisms leveled against market orientation (MO) by arguing that it has both responsive and proactive dimensions. However, few studies have empirically examined the complexity of the effects of these dimensions on firm performance. Drawing on theories of resource‐based advantage and organizational search behavior, this article advances understanding by arguing that responsive and proactive market orientations have curvilinear effects on product development performance, that their interaction may be positively related to product development performance, and that their effects on new product program performance are moderated differentially by the organizational implementation conditions and marketing function power. Survey results of 175 U.S. firms indicate support for most of the hypotheses. Specifically, whereas responsive MO has a U‐shaped relationship with new product program performance, proactive MO has an inverted U‐shaped relationship with new product program performance. Contrary to the arguments presented here, the interaction of both orientations is negatively related to new product program performance. This study finds that both orientations are needed; however, new product program performance is enhanced when one is at higher level and the other is at lower level. Finally, responsive MO is only positively related to new product program performance under specific conditions such as when strategic consensus among managers is high. On the other hand, the positive effect of proactive MO on new product program performance is further strengthened when learning orientation and marketing power are high. Overall, this study suggests that the effects of responsive and proactive MO on new product program performance are more complex than previously theoretically argued and empirically examined.