Book Reviews

Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986 pp. xxv + 425. Indexed. $19.95.

W.L. Korthals Altes, Changing Economy in Indonesia: Volume 7: Balance of Payments, 1822–1939, Amsterdam: The Royal Tropical Institute. pp. 167.

Trade Statistics, Java, 1823–73: Trade Statistics, Indonesia 1874–1937. Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek nos 160 and 161

Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985 pp. xii + 291, map, tables. graphs, glossary, index. Cloth $38.50.

Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro, Social Organization and Planned Development in Rural Java, Singapore, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, pp. xv + 326.

A. Fujimoto and F. Matsuda (eds), An Economic Study of Rice Farming in West Java, Tokyo: NODAI Research Institute, Tokyo, University of Agriculture, 1986.

A. Fujimoto and T. Matsuda (eds), A Comparative Study of the Structure of Rice Productivity and Rural Society in Southeast Asta Two Village Studies in Indonesta and Thailand, Tokyo: University of Agriculture, 1985. Reviewed by C.L J. van der Meer (1986) Bulletin of Indanesian Economic Studies, 22(2) pp. 124–27

David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975–1983, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series No. 64, 1984, pp. xiii + 280. US$12.50. David Bourchier, Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia Sawito and the Phantom Coup, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, 1984, pp. 128. US$9.00.

Linda G. Martin (ed), The ASEAN Success Story: Social, Economic, and Political Dimensions, East-West Center, distributed by the University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987, pp. xviii + 253. $15.00.

Mubyarto and Edy Suandy Hamid (eds), Kredit Pedesaan di Indonesia, Badan Penerbit Fakultas Ekonomi, U.G.M., 1986 pp, 160.

Ron Hatley, et al., Other Javas Away from the Kraton, Melbourne: Monash University, 1984, pp. 60.

K.S. Nathan and M. Pathmanathan (eds), Trilateralism in Asia: Problems and Prospects in US-Japan-ASEAN Relations, Antara Book Company, Kuala Lumpur, 1986, pp. xviii + 205. $18.00 (cloth): $12.00 (paper).     

The welfare effects of import “subquotas” on heterogeneous product categories

In spite of its importance to policy makers, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the welfare effects of one aspect of trade policy-how to implement an import quota that applies to a heterogeneous product category. The government can impose a simple quota that applies indiscriminately to all goods within the product category or it can divide the quota among them with subquotas. In this paper, we analyze the welfare effects of subquotas. Under certain simplifying assumptions we find that a system of subquotas nearly always exists that provides greater welfare than a simple quota for a large country that retains quota rights or for a large or small country that gives quota rights away to foreigners. However, subquotas cannot increase the welfare of a small country that retains quota rights. The difference lies in the effect of imports on the home country's terms of trade.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the US International Trade Commission. The authors are grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft by anonymous referees.     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

Water accounting for the Orange River Basin: An economic perspective on managing a transboundary resource

The framework for water accounting is applied to an international river basin, the Orange River Basin, which is shared among Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. Each of the riparian states faces water constraints and relies increasingly on shared international water resources. The countries have adopted the principle of an economic approach to water management, once basin human needs are met, and all but Lesotho have constructed national water accounts to assist in water management. The water accounts for the Orange River Basin bring an economic perspective to water management at the regional level. The accounts include supply and use tables, which are used to compare the contribution to water supply from each riparian state to the amount used. The water accounts are then linked to economic data for each country to calculate water use and productivity by industry and country. There are considerable disparities in water productivity among the countries, which should be taken into account in future decisions about water allocation, pricing and infrastructure development.     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

Small dimension PDE for discrete Asian options

This paper presents an efficient method for pricing discrete Asian options in presence of smile and non-proportional dividends. Using an homogeneity property, we show how to reduce an n0 dimensional problem to a one- or two-dimensional one. We examine different numerical specifications of our dimension reduced PDE using a Crank–Nicholson method (interpolation method, grid boundaries, time and space steps) as well as the extension to the case of non-proportional discrete dividends, using a jump condition. We benchmark our results with Quasi Monte-Carlo simulation and a multi-dimensional PDE     

Foreign direct investment, competition and industrial development in the host country

This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: A competition effect which deters entry of domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the number of domestic firms follows a u-shaped curve, where the competition effect first dominates but is gradually outweighed by positive externalities. Evidence for Ireland tends to support this result. Specifically, applying semi-parametric regression techniques on plant level panel data for the manufacturing sector we find that while the competition effect may have initially deterred local firms’ entry, this initial effect has been outpaced by positive externalities making the overall impact of FDI largely positive for the domestic industry.     

Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.