Organizational form and environment: an analysis of between‐form and within‐form responses to environmental change

This study extends previous research on organizational adaptation to major environmental shifts by empirically examining the potential constraining effects of organizational form, operationalized using the Miles and Snow typology, on the type of responses enacted as well as the performance effects of the responses. Results indicate that a fit between environmental contingencies and organizational form relates to superior performance. The results also provide support for the idea that organizations systematically move toward the higher‐performing forms for a given environment. Consistent with organizational configuration logic, while these responses lead to performance improvements when a between‐form change is made, they do not necessarily lead to performance improvements when a within‐form change is made. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered

Persson and Tabellini (Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992a. Growth, distribution and politics. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 593–602; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992b. Growth, distribution and politics. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 600–621) as well as Alesina and Rodrik (Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1992. Distribution, political conflict, and economic growth. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–50; Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth, Q. J. Econ. 109, 465–490) have argued that income inequality reduces economic growth rates among democracies because it promotes distributional struggles. In this paper I question the supportive evidence for a number of reasons. Measures of income distribution and democracy are unreliable and permit only very tentative conclusions. Changes in data sources or recoding of some influential cases affect results. It is questionable whether equality effects on growth apply only within democracies, as a median voter interpretation of this relationship should make one expect. The general idea that distributional struggle hurts the growth prospects of nations, however, receives some empirical support.     

Emerging needs of social innovators and social innovation ecosystems

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - Social innovations (SIs) contribute to solving or at least mitigating many of the most pressing grand challenges. Similar to profit-oriented...     

Unit root tests of the current account balance: implications for international capital mobility

The extent of international capital mobility is assessed in a time series context. The possibility that the current account balance of different 0ECD countries contains a unit root is explored. It is shown that if the ratio of the current account balance to GDP is found to be integrated of the order of one, the country is likely to be part of the world capital market. The results for the whole period 1950–1988 indicate that the current account balance of at least Germany, Japan and the United States contains a unit root. Considering the subperiods before and after 1972 it is shown that international capital mobility increased after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System.     

Can below-replacement fertility be desirable?

In this paper, we challenge the widespread notion that replacement level fertility is the most desirable level of fertility both for countries currently above and below this level. We discuss possible alternative criteria for choosing one fertility level over another. In accordance with earlier studies, we focus on age dependency as the sole criterion. But we do so by relaxing the strong assumption that all individuals of a given age are equal in terms of their economic contribution to society and introduce education as probably the most relevant observable source of population heterogeneity. Our criterion variable is the education-weighted support ratio and we perform thousands of alternative simulations for different constant levels of fertility, starting from empirically given populations. If education is assumed to present a cost at young age and results in higher productivity during working age, then for most countries the desirable long-term total fertility rate turns out to be well below replacement level.     

Openness and economic growth in developing countries

Openness and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. — Openness appears to have a strong impact on economic growth especially in DCs which typically exhibit a high share of physical capital in factor income and a low share of labor. In the neoclassical growth model with partial capital mobility, physical capital’s share in factor income determines the difference in the predicted convergence rates for open and closed economies. With a 60 percent share as in many DCs, the convergence rates should differ by a factor of 2.5. The regression results for a sample of open and closed DCs roughly confirm this hypothesis.     

Accounting for the stock of human capital: Selected evidence and potential implications

Accounting for the Stock of Human Capital: Selected Evidence and Potential Implications. — Given the observed distribution of output and labor across countries, most capital flows should be from rich to poor countries. As is shown for a limited sample of countries, accounting for differences in the stock of human capital substantially reduces the implicit cross-country rate of return differentials. Additionally, accounting for human capital externalities based on independent empirical evidence, turns around the predicted rate of return differentials in favor of rich countries. Hence, the world economy may converge to a rather unequal distribution of incomes as long as human capital accumulation is neglected as the key variable limiting economic development.