The Solow model in the empirics of growth and trade

Translated to a cross-country context, the Solow model (Solow,1956) predicts that international differences in steady-stateoutput per person are due to international differences in technologyfor a constant capital–output ratio. However, most ofthe empirical growth literature that refers to the Solow modelhas employed a specification where steady-stateifferences inoutput per person are due to international differences in thecapital–output ratio for a constant level of technology.My empirical results show that the former specification cansummarize the data quite well by using a measure of institutionaltechnology and treating the capital–output ratio as partof the regression constant. This reinterpretation of the cross-countrySolow model provides an implication for empirical studies ofinternational trade. Harrod-neutral technology differences,as presumed by the Solow model, can explain why countries havedifferent factor intensities and may end up in different conesof specialization.     

Identification and Estimation of Engel Curves with Endogenous and Unobserved Expenditures

When dealing with the estimation of Engel curves, measurement errors in expenditure data and simultaneity are likely sources of endogeneity. In this paper we study identification of the parameters that characterize an Engel curve in the presence of both. We consider specifications where budget shares are polynomials in the logarithm of total expenditure, which is the case frequently encountered in empirical applications. We propose an estimation procedure which is an extension of that in Lewbel ( 1996 ) and exploits a control function assumption to correct for the endogeneity of the true unobserved total expenditure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Drei Probleme der Monopoltheorie

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The ‘Whys’ and ‘Hows’ of ethical investment: Understanding an early-stage market through an explorative approach

Over the last decade, markets for investments have changed in Europe. Consumers have become more aware of ethical standards and violations of social values and norms. While in some countries, such as the United States, this change took place decades ago, the market for ethical investment in Europe is still at an early stage. The present study investigates the underlying motives for ethical assets of consumers in early-stage markets. Using seven interviews with financial experts and five focus groups with ethical and conventional investors, we examine how investors view ethical investment, how ethical investors are described in terms of socio-demographics and personality characteristics, and which attitudinal factors are related to ethical investment behaviour. Interviews and focus groups are recorded and qualitatively analysed according to grounded theory. Ethical investment is found to be characterised through negative and positive ethical criteria. Our findings demonstrate how essential it is for ethical investors to lead a certain lifestyle driven by particular ecological and social values. Attitude theory serves to explain ethical investment behaviour. Conclusions for the marketing of ethical investment funds and for future research are drawn.     

Joint European development strategy

On July 27,1971, the Commission of the European Communities has submitted a memorandum on a Joint European development policy to the governments of the EEC’s member states. It has thereby called for a beginning of the discussion on cooperative action by the Communities also in the field of development policies.     

Morton Wagman,Cognitive Science and the Mind-Body Problem: From Philosophy to Psychology to Artificial Intelligence to Imaging of the Brain

Teaching Business Ethics -     

Connections and performance in bankers’ turnover

In this paper we study the impact of the connections of the top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) of Italian banks on their turnover and on bank performance. We measure managers’ connections by the kilometer distance between the province of the bank's headquarter and the manager's province of birth. We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank, and whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank's performance. We find that connections generally decrease the probability of bank manager’s turnover, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure is strongly attenuated once connections are taken into account. Furthermore we find that for any bank type performance does not increase with connections. On the contrary, we show that having connected managers hurts performance in Mutual, Cooperative and Rural banks. Overall these findings suggest that connections are collusion devices to share and maintain rents at the expenses of bank performance.