Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems

This paper analyzes information exchange in a model of transnational pollution control in which countries use private information in independently determining their domestic environmental policies. We show that countries may not always have an incentive to exchange their private information. However, for a sufficiently high degree of predictability of domestic environmental policy processes, the expected welfare from sharing information is greater than the expected welfare from keeping it private. The minimum degree of policy predictability for which information sharing occurs increases with the level of environmental risk. Intuitively, information exchange can help mitigate the perception of global uncertainty (both political and scientific) that surrounds transnational environmental problems and potentially improve welfare if policymaking processes are sufficiently aligned with evidence-based approaches (predictable).     

Information Technology As A Factor Of Production: The Role Of Differences Among Firms

Despite evidence that information technology (IT) has recently become a productive investment for a large cross-section of firms, a number of questions remain. Some of these issues can be addressed by extending the basic production function approach that was applied in earlier work. Specifically, in this short paper we: 1) control for individual firm differences in productivity by employing a ‘firm effects’ specification, 2) consider the more flexible translog specification instead of only the Cobb-Douglas specification, and 3) allow all parameters to vary between various subsectors of the economy.

We find that while ‘firm effects’ may account for as much as half of the productivity benefits imputed to IT in earlier studies, the elasticity of IT remains positive and statistically significant. We also find that the estimates of IT elasticity and marginal product are little-changed when the less restrictive translog production function is employed. Finally, we find only limited evidence of differences in IT's marginal product between manufacturing and services and between the ‘measurable’ and ‘unmeasurable’ sectors of the economy. Surprisingly, we find that the marginal product of IT is at least as high in firms that did not grow during 1988–1992 sample period as it is in firms that grew.     

Externalities of R&D Expenditures

Innovation is generally recognized as a major source of economic growth. R&D investments explicitly aim at generating innovations and creating knowledge. Since knowledge has certain public good properties, positive externalities are likely to exist. In this paper, we extend well-known concepts from the input-output literature (backward multipliers) to indicate at which commodities stimuli should be targeted to enhance R&D and its positive externalities in the economy as a whole. Next, we argue that there may also be negative externalities of R&D, due to increased prices. This issue can be studied by means of forward multipliers. Both concepts are applied to the United States, 1977-90.     

China Adopts EVA: An Essential Step in the Great Leap Forward*

At the start of 2010, the Central SASAC initiated a three‐year “Performance Assessment Policy” that has the potential to transform Chinese business practices. Since 2010, return on capital has been a major criterion in the performance evaluation and compensation of the senior managements of the 100 largest Chinese state‐owned enterprises. Although sales growth will still count for 60% of executive assessment, 40% will be determined by a simplified version of EVA, or Economic Value Added. The guiding principle behind the new policy is simple and straightforward: Executives of state‐owned enterprises are now being asked to manage capital more efficiently than they have in the past—and in much the same way that private enterprises are now expected to do. Observers might be inclined to downplay this change. The assessed cost for capital, at 5.5%, is well below the market's required rate of return. And SASAC may not allow the firms to close plants, make positions redundant, and lay off employees. Veteran managers may try to outlive the interest in EVA, expecting SASAC's new standards to be unenforced. But SASAC's leaders expect a few pioneering companies to take the framework farther than the guidelines demand. To the extent they succeed in creating value for their shareholders, these companies could help bring about important change at many other Chinese companies.     

Competition between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra

Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the nuclei for further mergers and co‐operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched‐sample approach to compare execution costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. The differences are more pronounced for less liquid stocks. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse selection component. Realised spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.     

Stock Recommendations in Swedish Printed Media: Leading or Misleading?

Abstract

This paper analyses the initiated and changed recommendations published in six well-known Swedish newspapers and business magazines for the period 1996–2000 using a buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) approach. The results distinguish between recommendations from analysts and journalists. Buy recommendations were misleading investors, whereas sell recommendations were leading them correctly, overall yielding returns in line with the market. This asymmetry is due to positive information from the management of the company being more intricate to interpret than negative. Both good and bad information provided by the management is generally positively biased, a phenomenon influencing both analyst and journalist recommendations. Following buy and sell recommendations from analysts yielded BHARs in line with those from journalists, which in turn generates returns in line with their peers. Going short in the recommended stocks, irrespective of type and origin, would lead to a 24-month BHAR of 14%.     

Genetische Untersuchungen im Versicherungsbereich – Offene Fragen im Rahmen von § 18 GenDG

The paper refers to legal questions that arise in connection with the collection and use of genetic data in the context of private insurance. The content and meaning of § 18 GenDG is described. Then, § 18 GenDG is set in relation to notification requirements out of the VVG. The paper exemplarily emphasizes that, despite the codification of GenDG, specific legal problems arise. Accordingly, the paper provides solutions to overcome these problems. Particular problems refer to the role of genetic data of third parties and according relations to the family history, possibilities to communicate genetic data by the insured in case of medical indication, the ratio of predictive and diagnostic genetic testing and the range of the total limits of § 18 I 2 GenDG.     

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

The constant preferences assumption as a specification error in demand analysis

Complete demand systems often are estimated under the assumption that preferences are constant. If preferences do change in reality, this leads to a specification error. This note explores some of the implications of such a specification error.