Modelling momentum winner/loser asymmetry: the sources of winner and loser returns in the ASX200 and S&P500

There is an established body of work showing that the sources of momentum returns change over time. This paper finds that there is also winner/loser asymmetry – that the sources of the winner and loser components of momentum returns differ from each other at the same point in time. Together, these results raise concerns about the prospect of finding a single cause for momentum profits, as most efforts to date have tried to do. Rather, they indicate that investigation should proceed using time‐varying, nonparametric and ensemble techniques.     

Real exchange rate shocks and new product margins in the export market

This study examines the impact of industry real exchange rate (RER) shocks on plant and product exports using a comprehensive dataset for South Korea from 1990 to 1996. We find that RER changes have heterogeneous effects on real exports of existing exporters in terms of their productivity, and the positive RER depreciation effect on exports is more pronounced for less productive plants. At a product level, we find new evidence that a weak home currency prompts exporters to introduce new products to the export market, especially more remarkable for low-productivity plants. In contrast, a strong home currency leads to product exit with less significance.     

Tying in two-sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing

We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.