Does City Structure Affect Job Search and Welfare?

We develop a model in which workers' search efficiency is negatively affected by access to jobs. Workers' location in a city is endogenous and reflects a trade-off between commuting costs and the surplus associated with search. Different configurations emerge in equilibrium; notably, the unemployed workers may reside far away (segregated city) or close to jobs (integrated city). We prove that there exists a unique and stable market equilibrium in which both land and labor markets are solved for simultaneously. We find that, despite inefficient search in the segregated city equilibrium, the welfare difference between the two equilibria is not so large due to differences in commuting costs. We also show how a social planner can manipulate wages by subsidizing/taxing the transport costs and can accordingly restore the efficiency.     

Are elections debt brakes? Evidence from French municipalities

We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher, it compensates for the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.     

How efficient is maize production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe? A comparison of semiparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses

The controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe that redistributes commercially-owned farmland to smallholder households has caused concerns about the efficiency of agricultural production in the country. In this paper, we estimate the efficiency of resource use among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe when producing maize, the staple crop in the country. Using both a semiparametric model and a fully parametric stochastic frontier model, we find significant production shortfalls for smallholder maize production. While labor, capital, and land all significantly affect the total output, the estimated mean efficiency score for farms with less than 10 hectares of land (A1) appears to be under 0.75, and for the entire sample (A1 and A2) it ranges between 0.595 and 0.772. There clearly exists a great potential for maize farmers to improve the technical efficiency and increase the total output. Gender and age of the household head, access to extension services, and activities of other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. We also find that all farms operate under increasing returns to scale and that the technical efficiency score tends to increase with the level of output.     

From private to public common agency

This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities.     

A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS*

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within‐firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold‐up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.     

An introduction to the special feature section: Price,wage and employment adjustments in 2007–2008 and some inference for the current European crisis

The four papers in this issue are part of a collective effort coordinated by the ECB and European National Central Banks, the Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics Network Survey. They provide new and systematic evidence on wage and price flexibility in Europe and attempt to explain their determinants.     

An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Abstract.  This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided. The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods. The rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information. It is constituted of two main parts. In the first one, the social planner has complete contracting ability. We discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade-offs it generates. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness. Such incompleteness can emerge from various sources, which we present and discuss. We then study the case of a politically chosen decision-maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups. Finally, we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision. The concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons.