Contract costs,stakeholder capitalism,and ESG

Observed contract structures are competitive solutions to the problem of maximizing stakeholder welfare when contracting is costly. Winning contract structures typically set fixed payoffs for most stakeholders, with residual risk borne by shareholders, who then get most of the decision rights. With rising interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, there is sentiment for replacing the max shareholder wealth decision rule with max shareholder welfare. This view does not recognize that investors view max welfare in terms of their overall consumption-investment portfolios. Since firms are not privy to the total ESG exposures of shareholders, max shareholder wealth is the appropriate decision rule.     

Taxes

This is a compendium of notes on taxes. Section 2 presents a general tax scheme. It is a tax on value added by labour and capital that does not favour one or the other. Section 3 contrasts taxation of business income for pass-through entities and corporations. Section 4 discusses property taxes as taxes on housing services and so a form of income tax. Section 5 turns to wealth taxes. The closing Section 6 attempts to explain why people donate to nonprofits but minimise tax payments to governments, even though governments and nonprofits engage in many of the same activities.     

A resource‐based perspective on human capital losses,HRM investments,and organizational performance

Reversing the focus on human capital accumulations in the resource‐based literature, the authors examine the issue of human capital losses and organizational performance. They theorize that human capital losses markedly diminish the inimitability of human capital stores initially, but that the negative effects are attenuated as human capital losses increase. They argue further that these effects are more dramatic when human resource management (HRM) investments are substantial. As predicted, Study 1 shows that the human capital losses (voluntary turnover rates)‐workforce performance relationship takes the form of an attenuated negative relationship when HRM investments are high. Study 2 shows stronger curvilinear effects of voluntary turnover rates on financial performance via workforce productivity under these conditions. Implications for resource‐based theory and strategic HRM are addressed.     

Winners in the spotlight: Media coverage of fund holdings as a driver of flows

We show that media coverage of mutual fund holdings affects how investors allocate money across funds. Fund holdings with high past returns attract extra flows, but only if these stocks were recently featured in the media. In contrast, holdings that were not covered in major newspapers do not affect flows. We present evidence that media coverage tends to contribute to investors? chasing of past returns rather than facilitate the processing of useful information in fund portfolios. Our evidence suggests that media coverage can exacerbate investor biases and that it is the primary mechanism that makes fund window dressing effective.     

CAPITAL STRUCTURES IN EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

This paper studies developments in the Hungarian capital markets during 1992–95 and investigates the determinants of the capital structures of companies listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. Hungarian companies had very low leverage ratios. Empirical findings indicate that the negative relationship between leverage and proportion of tangible assets was primarily caused by the lack of long‐term debt financing. The relationship between leverage and the size of the company provides some indication of the importance of trade credits for the companies. The more profitable companies had less debt than less profitable ones. This is attributed to the firms’financial incentives aggravated by the segmentation of Hungarian credit markets and credit rationing within the financial environment. Manufacturing firms and firms with the state among their major shareholders enjoyed higher levels of debt financing relative to other companies.