Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games

We study the set of limit points of equilibrium payoffs in n-player repeated games, with bounded recall, when the memory capacities of all the players grow to infinity. Two main issues are explored: (i) whether differential information enables players to play correlatively, and (ii) the extent to which boundedly rational players can learn others′ behavior patterns and conceal their own. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.     

On Compliance with Ethical Standards in Tax Return Preparation

The Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice (SRTPs) provide guidance to the CPA when making decisions in tax practice. Many of these decisions are ethical in nature and have implications for tax compliance. In this study, a survey methodology is used to test whether the SRTPs affect decisions that CPAs make. The findings suggest that a clear majority of CPAs follow the SRTPs when making ethical decisions relating to tax return preparation and that CPAs follow the SRTPs more often than unlicensed preparers on half the issues tested. However, a statistically significant number of CPAs do not follow the SRTPs and, CPAs do not follow the SRTPs any more often than unlicensed tax preparers on three issues.     

A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games

Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.     

An Experimental Examination of US Individual Donors’ Information Needs and Use

This paper adopts an internet‐based experiment to investigate whether and how individual donors use nonprofit organizations’ financial and nonfinancial information when making their donation decisions. Using undergraduate students in the United States (US) to proxy for individual donors, our results indicate that individual donors are more likely to acquire nonfinancial information, such as nonprofit organizations’ goals, outcomes, programs and missions, than financial information. Donors integrate nonfinancial information into their decisions as their actual donations are significantly correlated with such information. Our results also indicate that while individual donors acquire financial efficiency measures, including the program expense ratio and fundraising expense ratio, they do not seem to integrate such information into their decisions as their actual donations are not significantly correlated with the efficiency information. This study contributes to the nonprofit literature and research domain focusing on charitable giving and donor preferences.     

The Conflict of Ethos and Ethics: A Sociological Theory of Business People’s Ethical Values

This article develops a sociological theory of ambivalence to explain several puzzling and contradictory ethical attitudes of business people: (1) a simultaneous disposition to comparatively more self-interested and more charitable behavior than many other occupational groups and (2) a moderate level of receptiveness to inculcation of moral principles through social channels such as higher education. We test the theory by comparing the way that business students rate the ethical acceptability of various ethically challenging scenarios with the way that criminal justice students rate these same scenarios. We also explore the malleability of ethical views by measuring differences between the responses of sophomores and seniors. The data generally support hypotheses based on a theory of ambivalence. At the same time, however, we also report on findings that suggest alternative explanations to ambivalence.     

Problems of large‐scale fashion designers in Accra,Ghana

A survey was conducted to investigate the problems faced by large‐scale fashion designers in Ghana. Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The problems the respondents encountered were manpower, economic, logistic and social. Additional training in fashion design outside Ghana and a high level of education were identified as assets in the export trade. Suggestions to the Ghanaian Government and other stake holders, to improve the fashion industry and thus enable the industry to contribute effectively to the realization of the economic goals outlined in ‘Ghana’s Vision 2020’ (development plan), are discussed.     

Approachability with bounded memory

We study Blackwell's approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs when the approaching player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory: either strategies with bounded recall, or strategies that can be implemented by finite automata. Our main finding is that the following three statements are equivalent for closed sets. (i) The set is approachable with bounded recall strategies. (ii) The set is approachable with strategies that can be implemented with finite automata. (iii) The set contains a convex approachable set. Using our results we show that (i) there are almost-regret-free strategies with bounded memory, (ii) there is a strategy with bounded memory to choose the best among several experts, and (iii) Hart and Mas-Colell's adaptive learning procedure can be achieved using strategies with bounded memory.     

Relative entropy in sequential decision problems

Consider an agent who faces a sequential decision problem. At each stage the agent takes an action and observes a stochastic outcome (e.g., daily prices, weather conditions, opponents' actions in a repeated game, etc.). The agent's stage-utility depends on his action, the observed outcome and on previous outcomes. We assume the agent is Bayesian and is endowed with a subjective belief over the distribution of outcomes. The agent's initial belief is typically inaccurate. Therefore, his subjectively optimal strategy is initially suboptimal. As time passes information about the true dynamics is accumulated and, depending on the compatibility of the belief with respect to the truth, the agent may eventually learn to optimize. We introduce the notion of relative entropy, which is a natural adaptation of the entropy of a stochastic process to the subjective set-up. We present conditions, expressed in terms of relative entropy, that determine whether the agent will eventually learn to optimize. It is shown that low entropy yields asymptotic optimal behavior. In addition, we present a notion of pointwise merging and link it with relative entropy.     

Harmonization of food trade standards and regulations in ASEAN: the case of Malaysia's food imports

Regulatory heterogeneity continues to be identified as a challenge for food trade in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the progress of harmonization of food standards among member states remains slow. Using a new and comprehensive database on nontariff measures (NTMs), this article examines the coverage, frequency, and diversity of NTMs for the food sector in Malaysia, and then estimates their impact on food imports from ASEAN. The food sector in Malaysia is found to be highly regulated, dominated by technical measures, namely, labeling for sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade reasons, product quality, and restricted substances. The empirical results subsequently verify that, overall, technical measures are import restrictive. This article therefore contends that harmonization of food standards and regulations at the regional level is important for enhancing trade. However, building common ground for food safety regulations should be NTM‐ and sector‐specific, to realize progress in terms of regulatory convergence. This is particularly true for the food sector, since complete harmonization is not practical and not politically feasible.     

Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load

It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427–430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects’ decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.