Customer focus helps utility see the light

Florida Power & Light knew it had to transform the way it operated to remain competitive. The key was to understand changing customer needs and build those needs into its planning process.     

多阶段实验室实验中参与者行为调整过程的估测--在一价共同价值拍卖中的应用

许多用多阶段实验数据检验的经济学关系本身是一种动态的关系,理应用动态方法建模。面板数据的时间维度使我们有机会掌握经济行为调整的动态过程。在这样的数据结构下,普通最小二来法、随机影响和固定影响的估测方法导致有偏的和不一致的参数估计。在本文中,我们分析了一系列一价共同价值拍卖(first price common valueauction)实验的数据。我们采用的动态面板数据估计法能作出无偏一致的参数估计。通过研究没有经验和经验丰富的竞价者如何在各自的实验过程中调整竞价策略,我们发现,经验丰富的竞价者会因前期的实际损失调整他们的竞价策略(折现率),但是其他形式的信息反馈对他们没有明显的影响,而无经验竞价者的竞价策略会受各种反馈信息的影响,且往往比经验丰富的竞价者反映更强。最后,经验丰富的和无经验的竞价者都在策略调整中基本忽视以前的经验(竞价策略)。     

Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals

This paper introduces a novel approach to integrals with respect to capacities. Any random variable is decomposed as a combination of indicators. A prespecified set of collections of events indicates which decompositions are allowed and which are not. Each allowable decomposition has a value determined by the capacity. The decomposition-integral of a random variable is defined as the highest of these values. Thus, different sets of collections induce different decomposition-integrals. It turns out that this decomposition approach unifies well-known integrals, such as Choquet, the concave and Riemann integral. Decomposition-integrals are investigated with respect to a few essential properties that emerge in economic contexts, such as concavity (uncertainty-aversion), monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance and translation-covariance. The paper characterizes the sets of collections that induce decomposition-integrals, which respect each of these properties.     

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs. In two-person zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers for two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided, where only one player is informed.