Getting it right the second time

Once a business performs a complex activity well, the parent organization often wants to replicate that success. But doing that is surprisingly difficult, and businesses nearly always fail when they try to reproduce a best practice. The reason? People approaching best-practice replication are overly optimistic and overconfident. They try to perfect an operation that's running nearly flawlessly, or they try to piece together different practices to create the perfect hybrid. Getting it right the second time (and all the times after that) involves adjusting for overconfidence in your own abilities and imposing strict discipline on the process and the organization. The authors studied numerous business settings to find out how organizational routines were successfully reproduced, and they identified five steps for successful replication. First, make sure you've got something that can be copied and that's worth copying. Some processes don't lend themselves to duplication; others can be copied but maybe shouldn't be. Second, work from a single template. It provides proof success, performance measurements, a tactical approach, and a reference for when problems arise. Third, copy the example exactly, and fourth, make changes only after you achieve acceptable results. The people who developed the template have probably already encountered many of the problems you want to "fix," so it's best to create a working system before you introduce changes. Fifth, don't throw away the template. If your copy doesn't work, you can use the template to identify and solve problems. Best-practice replication, while less glamorous than pure innovation, contributes enormously to the bottom line of most companies. The article's examples--Banc One, Rank Xerox, Intel, Starbucks, and Re/Max Israel--prove that exact copying is a non-trivial, challenging accomplishment.     

Demand,innovation, and the dynamics of market structure: The role of experimental users and diverse preferences

The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concentration tends to grow. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many case new entrants survive and grow, and the large established firms do not make the transition. In other cases, the established firms are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. This paper explores a model which generates this pattern and has focused on the characteristics of the demand. We argue that the ability of the new firms exploring the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.

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Franco MalerbaEmail:

     

Clicks and Mortar: The Effect of On-line Activities on Off-line Sales

Retailers did not immediately extend their business to the Internet environment, fearing that on-line activities could adversely impact their off-line sales. To facilitate assessment of the impact of on-line activities on off-line sales, we develop a method that allows retailers to use readily available market data for making informed decisions. The proposed method determines (1) the extent to which on-line sales cannibalize off-line sales, and (2) whether on-line activities build on-line equity for the firm. We illustrate the method using data from Tower Records' Internet sales division. We find that on-line sales do not significantly cannibalize retail sales and that the firm's web activities build long-term on-line equity. While the proposed method can be used by any clicks-and-mortar firm, our firm-specific results indicate that Towers' fears regarding cannibalization due to its own Internet activities were unfounded.     

Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.     

The Role of Private Label Brands in Enhancing Service Satisfaction in the Hotel Industry: Comparing Luxury and Boutique Hotels

ABSTRACT

This research proposes private label branding as a strategy that can have a positive effect on guest satisfaction and loyalty in hotels that cater to travelers seeking a special hotel experience. We test this using a sample of guests in two hotels: a five-star luxury hotel (N = 225) and a boutique hotel (N = 101). Findings show that in the luxury hotel but not the boutique hotel, perception of a private label had a direct impact on loyalty, and an indirect impact on loyalty through its effect on guest satisfaction. The theoretical implications and recommendations for hoteliers based on the findings are discussed.     

Capital and labor misallocation in the Netherlands

Journal of Productivity Analysis - Using firm-level panel data we analyze the misallocation of capital and labor for the Netherlands in the period 2001–2017. We use the dispersion in marginal...     

Trading with the crowd

We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with taking into account a common general price predicting signal. The unique Nash-equilibrium strategies reveal how each agent's liquidation policy adjusts the predictive trading signal to the aggregated transient price impact induced by all other agents. This unfolds a quantitative relation between trading signals and the order flow in crowded markets. We also formulate and solve the corresponding mean field game in the limit of infinitely many agents. We prove that the equilibrium trading speed and the value function of an agent in the finite N-player game converges to the corresponding trading speed and value function in the mean field game at rate $O(N^{-2})$. In addition, we prove that the mean field optimal strategy provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for the finite-player game.     

Closed-loop Nash competition for liquidity

We study a multiplayer stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium exists if the price impact parameter is small enough. Compared to the corresponding open-loop Nash equilibrium, both the agents' optimal trading rates and their performance move towards the central-planner solution, in that excessive trading due to lack of coordination is reduced. However, the size of this effect is modest for plausible parameter values.