Markets,torts, and social inefficiency

We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose.     

DEFAULT RISK PREMIA IN THE NEAR-CASH INVESTMENT MARKET: THE CASE OF AUCTION RATE PREFERRED STOCK VERSUS COMMERCIAL PAPER

Auction rate preferred stock (ARPS) is often regarded as an alternative to other near-cash instruments such as commercial paper while the dividend exclusion for ARPS offers tax advantages to corporate purchasers. The mean default risk premium for ARPS, relative to commercial paper, is estimated at 83 basis points during stable financial markets. This default premium appears to surge during unstable equity markets, having jumped by 192 basis points in November 1987. Lower-rated ARPS shows even larger changes, with yields 40–50 basis points above yields on high-rated ARPS, adjusted for the normal risk premium differential. The perceived risk change of ARPS underscores how quickly market participants re-evaluate default risk, and even the importance of the priority order among debt and equity claimants. Findings suggest ARPS and commercial paper are not an acceptable substitute for commercial paper during times of unsettled equity markets.     

Top management team turnover as an adaptation mechanism: The role of the environment

Based on an organizational adaptation framework, this study examines the influence of three environmental dimensions–munificence, stability, and complexity–on top management team turnover. In addition to investigating the direct influence of these environmental dimensions, indirect effects through firm performance and strategic change are also examined; the indirect effect of environmental complexity through demographic heterogeneity is also studied. Path analysis indicates that the direct effects of the three environmental dimensions predominate. Indirect effects were nonsignificant except for the effect of instability and munificence through strategic change. By expanding the team turnover context to include environmental and strategic dimensions, in addition to previously examined performance and heterogeneity factors, this study enhances our understanding of managerial turnover as a form of organizational adaptation.