The Impacts of the California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act on Consumers

In late 1987 the California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act went into effect. Like mandatory beverage deposit legislation in other states, this Act is designed to promote returns through the payment of a redemption value. However, unlike traditional legislation, the Act attempts to promote recycling with lower redemption values and more state intervention. This paper presents a methodology for analyzing the impacts of beverage container recycling legislation on consumers. Applying this methodology to California, it is found that the Act will significantly reduce beverage container solid waste and litter, but the net benefits of the Act depend critically on consumers' valuations of intangible benefits.     

Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labor Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?

Does monopsony on the labor market in itself justify the implementation of a minimum wage when it would not be used in a competitive economy? This issue is studied in a model of optimal taxation. We find that there is no room for the minimum wage when there are a continuum of skills with no isolated mass point at the bottom of the wage distribution. Accordingly, in the empirically relevant situation, where there is a continuum of wages at the bottom of the distribution, the minimum wage is not helpful.     

THE SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR BALLOT INITIATIVES: WHAT VOTERS CAN LEARN FROM LEGISLATIVE INACTION

This paper models the process through which proposals are placed on the ballot as initiatives. Importantly, proposals that reach the ballot were not enacted by the legislature. We show that this fact has important consequences for the type of policy proposals that reach the ballot: as the legislature would enact any proposal that increases everyone's utility (in expectation), proposals that reach the ballot must be bad for some segment of the population. We partition the population into voters who would benefit from a group's proposal and those who would not and show that voters can use the legislature's inaction to obtain a better estimate of the initiative's expected value. In particular, we show that voters that are not in the sponsoring group infer that proposals that become initiatives have negative expected value and that the expected value of an initiative is decreasing in the size of the group that sponsors it.     

The Development and Implementation of the Concept of Consumer Education

With the recent upsurge of emphasis in consumer education at the State and Federal government levels, consumer educators need to review the historical roots of the current movement to develop a broader perspective for planning future directions in consumer education. It is also necessary to understand the two orientations (buymanship and life goals) towards consumer education course content. Finally, a review of previous research into factors that influence the level of consumer economic competency is required.     

Clients of Commercial and Not-for-Profit Credit Counseling Agencies: Their Evaluations of Agency Services and Money Management Behavior

The number of family credit counseling agencies has expanded in recent years. The purpose of these agencies is to seek cooperation of lenders in setting up a plan whereby debtors can repay their debts. However, the agencies have sought not only to extricate clients from their current financial problems but also to educate them to avoid future financial problems. There is a debate in the credit counseling industry over whether the not-for-profit or the commercial agency can best serve debtor needs. This study is based on a survey of debtors who were clients of a not-for-profit agency or of a commercial agency. No significant differences were found in clients' evaluations of the services of the two agencies or in the credit and money management behavior of the two client groups.     

Coordinating Effort under Team‐Based and Individual Incentives: An Experimental Analysis*

This paper explores the behavior of workers in an environment where it is efficient to engage in the mutual exchange of help. Experimental data show that output and workers' payoffs are greater under team‐based incentives than under individual incentives in an environment where coordination is difficult. However, when the environment is more conducive to coordination (that is, a setting where agents interact repeatedly), output and payoffs are greater under individual incentives. Manipulation of the amount of mutually observable information provides evidence that team‐based incentives, relative to individual incentives, create a more difficult coordination problem for workers and that cooperation requires a richer informational environment.