When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.     

Punishing Vices or Rewarding Virtues? The Motivations for and Benefits of Ethical Ratings for Private Italian Companies

Journal of Business Ethics - In A Treatise on Virtues and Rewards, Dragonetti (1769) advances a theory of action based on rewards for virtues. The idea of rewards, especially of awards, relies on...     

The influence of managers' awareness of climate change,perceived climate risk exposure and risk tolerance on the adoption of corporate responses to climate change

Uncertainties posed by climate change limit companies' ability to understand implications of global warming on business and society at large, hampering the adoption of tangible organizational responses to climate change. Understanding climate action thus requires to investigate influential factors of decision-making under uncertainty, which implies acknowledging managerial interpretations and perceptions about climate issues. Drawing insights from the literature on climate inaction and from corporate sustainability literature, the present study examines awareness of climate change and perceived exposure to climate risks as antecedents of corporate responses to climate change, drawing on a survey of managers of Italian manufacturing companies. In addition, the study tests the moderation of risk tolerance on the relation between perceived climate risk exposure and climate action, suggesting that risk attitudes are a significant factor of decision-making under climate uncertainty. The results support the hypothesis of the model and thus provide several contributions to the literature on business and climate change. Managerial implications and avenues for future research are also discussed.     

Enhancing environmental information transparency through corporate social responsibility reporting regulation

This research aims to contribute to the scientific debate about the lack of interlinkages between mandatory non-financial reporting and sustainable business models. For our purposes, a counter-accounting analysis was conducted on the non-financial reports of a sample of 145 Italian firms interested by the Directive 2014/95/EU effects. Specifically, the study adopts an empirical approach to evaluate environmental information transparency, which represents one of the main critical issues concerning the non-financial declarations prepared by European Italian Public Interest Entities (PIEs) to comply with Directive 2014/95/EU. The results highlight that corporate governance and report characteristics affect environmental transparency. Furthermore, the results confirm the overall attitude to avoid the disclosure of unfavourable or unavailable environmental information through impression management strategies. Finally, the analysis underlines the opportunities for policymakers to rethink mandatory non-financial reporting to sustain the ecological transition of European PIEs.     

Nonlinear dynamics in economic modelling

Decisions in Economics and Finance -     

Growth maximizing government size,social capital,and corruption

Our paper intersects two topics in growth theory: the growth maximizing government size and the role of Social Capital in development. We modify a simple overlapping generations framework by introducing two key features: a production function à la Barro together with the possibility that public officials steal a fraction of public resources under their own control. As underlined by the literature on corruption, Social Capital affects public officials' accountability through many channels which also affect the probability of being caught for embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. Therefore, in our endogenous growth model such probability is taken as a proxy of Social Capital. We find that maximum growth rates are compatible with Big Government size, measured both in terms of expenditures and public officials, when associated with high levels of Social Capital.     

Insurance fraud detection: A statistically validated network approach

Fraud is a social phenomenon, and fraudsters often collaborate with other fraudsters, taking on different roles. The challenge for insurance companies is to implement claim assessment and improve fraud detection accuracy. We developed an investigative system based on bipartite networks, highlighting the relationships between subjects and accidents or vehicles and accidents. We formalize filtering rules through probability models and test specific methods to assess the existence of communities in extensive networks and propose new alert metrics for suspicious structures. We apply the methodology to a real database—the Italian Antifraud Integrated Archive—and compare the results to out-of-sample fraud scams under investigation by the judicial authorities.     

When income differences hurt or excite: The nonlinear effect of regional inequality on subjective wellbeing

Combining information from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions and the European Social Survey, we investigate the relationship between subjective well-being and income inequality using regional inequality indicators and individual data. We assume that inequality aversion and perception of social mobility affect the impact of regional inequality on subjective well-being in opposite directions. We find evidence of an inverse U-shaped effect of inequality, where inequality starts to have a positive effect on subjective well-being that becomes negative with a switch point before the average of the Gini index for the entire sample. The rationale for our nonlinear finding is that Hirschman's tunnel effect (and the positive effect of perceived social mobility) prevails for low levels of inequality, while inequality aversion and negative relative income effects are relatively stronger when inequality is higher. Robustness checks on different sample splits are consistent with the hypothesis of the two drivers.     

Tax shocks with high and low uncertainty

We assess whether the effects of fiscal policy depend on the extent of uncertainty in the economy. Focusing on tax shocks, identified by the narrative series by Romer and Romer (American Economic Review, 2010, 100(3), 763‐801), and various measures of uncertainty, we use a Threshold VAR model to allow for dependence of the effects of the tax shocks on both the level of uncertainty and the sign of the shock. We find that the economy responds more positively to tax cuts during periods of low uncertainty, while, in response to tax increases, the response of main aggregates is more negative in more uncertain times. We argue that controlling for monetary policy in fiscal VARs is important to avoid omitted variable bias. We interpret our empirical evidence in light of existing theoretical contributions.