Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).     

The market for corporate control: do countries and technological regimes matter?

Using DATASTREAM and LexisNexis databases, we examine the experience from 1995 to 2005 for eight European countries and 21 sectors, and compute the frequency of merger transactions at sectoral level, controlling for the roles of country variables and focusing on distinct technological patterns of innovation. We found that, even in market‐based countries, where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, mergers are less frequent in those sectors where innovation follows cumulative processes and where takeovers represent a ‘breach of knowledge.’ This study provides empirical support to the fruitful line of research of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001 Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D., eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] [Google Scholar]) and shows that sectoral differences in M&A (mergers and acquisitions) may be seen in their complementarities with differences by country and their institutional frameworks. Results confirm that acquisitions may occur even in those economies where block‐holders are present, but where the good quality of institutions leaves no space for defence against takeovers. It also highlights the significant role played by takeover regulation, and suggests that the recent reforms in European harmonization should be implemented, so that the obstacles impeding takeovers can be removed. However, policy‐makers should also try to identify for which economies and sectoral fields of specialization, merger activities produce more beneficial effects and which turn out to be detrimental.     

Democratic public good provision

This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic voting. Due to the lack of commitment to future policies, the tax burden may be on the wrong side of the dynamic Laffer curve. Moreover, restrictions on government policies can in some cases be welfare improving.     

New strategic goals and organizational solutions in large R&D labs: lessons from Centro Ricerche Fiat and Telecom Italia Lab

The issue of corporate R&D management has become particularly relevant during the last decade, since many industrial sectors experienced growing complexity in their research areas and increasing constraints in budgets devoted to R&D activities. This paper discusses the cases of the ICT and automotive sectors, exploring the changes in managerial procedures and strategies that two of the largest corporate research centres in Italy (Telecom Italia Lab and Centro Ricerche Fiat) adopted during a delicate phase of transition.
Both cases are characterized by a growing pressure towards the effective integration of short-term and long-term perspectives, i.e. towards a balance between valorization of research results and competencies, and exploration of new technological trajectories. The solutions adopted by the two organizations are explored and discussed. Specifically, while TiLab focused on the promotion of controlled spin-off companies, CRF has been very active in local technology transfer, especially in favour of SMFs.     

Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agents and two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. We show, through calibrations, how the mere difference on unemployment insurance, when countries experience a common skilled-biased technological shock, may result in differences in unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality. These results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in Europe and the United States in the last twenty-five years. The model is used to address some political economy issues.     

Migrants’ Remittances and Financial Development: Macro‐ and Micro‐Level Evidence of a Perverse Relationship

Financial development is commonly identified as an important condition for fostering investment and economic growth. It is also believed that migrants’ remittances stimulate financial development in the receiving economy, contributing indirectly to economic growth. We explore the relationship between remittances and financial development using macro‐ and micro‐level data. From cross‐country panel data, we find evidence of a negative relationship between remittances and financial deepening in developing countries. Using household survey data from a study of migrants’ remittances in two CIS countries, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, we also investigate the relationship between remittances, financial intermediation and ‘financial literacy’ among remittance‐receiving households. While we find some evidence of a positive, albeit weak, relationship for Kyrgyzstan, in Azerbaijan, the relatively more financially developed economy, we uncover a strong perverse relationship. Remittances appear to deter bank intermediation and use of formal banking services. Possible reasons are explored and areas for further investigation identified.