Distortionary company car taxation: deadweight losses through increased car ownership

We analyse the effects of distortionary company car taxation through increased household car consumption for the Netherlands. We use several identification strategies and demonstrate that for about 20 % of households company car possession increases car ownership. The annual welfare loss of distortionary company taxation through increased car ownership is generally rather small, maximally €120 per company car, and much less than the welfare loss through increased expenditure on the company car. However, for policies that exempt households from paying tax on their company car, the annual deadweight loss is likely higher. Our first-best tax policy recommendation is to increase company car tax rates. However, our current results suggest that a second-best policy, which keeps average company car taxation constant but which reduces the marginal tax on cheaper cars and increases the marginal tax on expensive cars, would be welfare improving as overconsumption of company cars will be reduced.     

A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Disclosing Sponsored Content

The amount of literature on the effects of disclosing sponsored content has increased greatly in recent years. Although the literature provides valuable insights into the effects of disclosing sponsored content, several research gaps remain, such as inconclusive findings, boundary conditions, and the mechanisms that explain how disclosures work. This article offers a meta-analysis of 61 papers that use 57 distinct data sets to address these research gaps. The results showed that disclosing sponsored content reduced brand attitudes, credibility, and source evaluation but increased recognition, persuasion knowledge, and resistance. Disclosure content, timing, and awareness, as well as product and sample characteristics, provide boundary conditions for the positive and negative effects of disclosures. A path model that tested the mechanism of disclosing sponsored content showed that, as suggested by memory priming effect, recognition of sponsored content increased memory but did not influence evaluation. Moreover, the understanding of sponsored content influenced evaluation, but memory remained unaffected, which corresponds to the flexible correction approach (i.e., consumers try to correct their answer to limit persuasive effects).     

Short‐Term Expectations in Listed Firms: The Effects Of Different Owner Types

We report empirical evidence in line with the disciplining role of different institutional and other owner types in reducing managerial myopia. Using data from a large Nordic survey, we find that companies, to a reasonably high degree, feel that external pressure for a good result in the short‐term generates conflict with the company's long‐term goals. We test for the effect of different ownership types and find that especially in firms with a large and non‐transitory activist or fund as an owner, the perceived pressure for short‐term actions is reduced. In addition, we observe a negative association between firm profitability and short‐term pressure, and we find that younger managers feel significantly more pressure. Firms subject to greater pressure engage in more actions to accommodate that pressure. Again, the impact of a large activist owner is especially beneficial because such firms significantly less often undertake actions that have the potential to destroy value, such as deprioritizing their long‐term investments or R&D.     

Sustainable Development and Business Models of Entrepreneurs in the Organic Food Industry

The business case for a sustainable firm, in particular the business case for new entrepreneurial initiatives responding to environmental demands, is increasingly receiving attention from practitioners and scholars. This article contributes to existing literature on business models, sustainable development and entrepreneurship, by applying components of business models to the practices of entrepreneurs that have a goal of environmental sustainability and a focus on the mass market (i.e. ecopreneurs). We define the ecopreneurial business model and specify four varieties of this business model, which consist of different combinations of environmental scope and a focus on the mass market and profitability. The distinguishing factor of the ecopreneurial business model is that it transforms disvalue into value, thereby creating greater customer value for environmentally concerned consumers. The results are based on a substantial set of interviews among ecopreneurs in the organic food and beverage industry in the Netherlands. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Competition and the signaling role of prices

In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect to the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among sellers affects the ability of sellers of high quality goods to achieve communication by means of appropriate pricing decisions in the context of a market populated by a large number of strategic price-setting sellers and a large number of buyers. When competition among sellers is weak high quality sellers are able to use prices as a signaling device and this enables them to trade. By contrast, strong competition among sellers inhibits the role of prices as signals of high quality, and high quality sellers are driven out of the market.     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).