WAGE CONTROLS DURING THE TRANSITION FROM CENTRAL PLANNING TO A MARKET ECONOMY

Wage controls have been integral to the stabilization programsof the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europethat are now moving toward market economies. The usual rationalefor such restraints in "heterodox" stabilization efforts hasbeen the need to break the momentum of inflationary expectations.In economies in transition the pervasive weakness of governanceof state enterprises supplies an added imperative: the controlsare needed to hold the line against pressures for excessivewage increases, which must ultimately be paid for by decapitalizationof firms, reduction of tax revenues, or accumulation of enterprisedebt. Examination of the design and enforcement of various systemsof wage control leads to the conclusion that wage controls inevitablydistort decisions on employment and work effort. These distortions,moreover, are the result of the same features of state enterprisesthat necessitate wage controls in the first place. Ultimately,the only way to avoid such distortions is to remove uncertaintyabout the timing of privatization, to ensure that workers andmanagement have a well-defined stake in the newly privatizedfirms, and to establish financial discipline over the enterprises.      

The new Capital Accord and banks’ lending decisions

Capital requirements (‘pillar one’ of the new Capital Accord) rising with the increase in borrowers’ PDs were thought as being likely: (i) to have a serious impact on the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (usually riskier than large corporates) and (ii) to increase the procyclicality of the supply of credit.

The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the possible impact of the new Accord proposals on the lending policies of Italian banks. We compare the interest rate charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements. Since the two variables move together in response to an increase in borrowers’ PDs, we conclude that the new regulatory approach to measuring capital adequacy appears consistent with banks’ own risk evaluations. This result is supported by a ‘stress testing’ exercise: the relationship also holds in a distressed economic scenario, which replicates the financial conditions of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993–1994 recession.     

Do international labor standards contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem?

In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child-labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child-labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child-labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child-labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child-labor.     

Mind the Gap: Inconsistencies Between Subjective and Objective Financial Risk Tolerance

Investors' financial risk tolerance is crucial in the formulation of suitable financial advice; in the past, assessment efforts relied on multiple approaches and techniques, but their consistency is still an issue. The authors focus on 2 metrics traditionally proposed (self-assessment and portfolio composition) and test their mutual consistency on a sample of 2,374 investors. The approach allows them to discriminate between inconsistencies due to wrong portfolio compositions and those arising from wrong self-assessments. The authors show that low financial literacy, high income, no children, and incautious economic behavior are commonly associated with such inconsistencies.     

The spillover of war in time and space: exploring some open issues

In spite of a voluminous empirical literature, the diffusion of civil war in time and space is still not fully understood and several issues remain open for debate. This article sheds new light on some of these issues. First, we assess the robustness of results to changes in the definition of neighbourhood (spatial dimension) and in the lag structure (temporal dimension). Second, we investigate the factors that determine the strength of civil war diffusion, focusing in particular on (i) the type of war (e.g. its intensity and scope), (ii) the quality of domestic polity, and (iii) interaction opportunities (e.g. ethnic ties and refugee flows). Third, we look at how the occurrence of war in a neighbouring country affects the duration (and not just the onset) of domestic civil war.     

Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems

Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.     

A geometric property of indifference curves in the (mean-standard deviation) plane

We prove that the slope of the indifference curve through point (m σ) of the (meanstandard deviation) plane must be smaller than the ratio (1+m)/σ. We show that the indifference curves corresponding to a quadratic utility function do actually satisfy that inequality; and prove, by the way, that these curves are not quarters of circles (as it is usually asserted), but smaller parts of them.

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Riassunto Si prova che, nel piano (media-scarto quadratico medio), l'inclinazione della curva d'indifferenza per il punto (m, σ) deve essere minore del rapporto (1+m)/gs. Si mostra che le curve d'indifferenza corrispondenti ad una funzione d'utilià quadratica soddisfano di fatto tale limitazione; e si prova, a questo proposito, che tali curve non sono — come generalmente asserito — quarti di circonferenze, ma archi più piccoli delle medesime.

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The second part of this article was stimulated by an observation of E. Castagnoli. The author gratefully acknowledges this to him.     

INFORMAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: AN ANALYSIS FOR THREE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Changes in formal and informal central bank independence (CBI) in France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the period from the mid-1970s to the 1990s are examined; the major changes occurred in the 1990s, after the disinflations of the 1980s. Broad trends in the informal independence of central banks (CBs), defined as the ability to pursue price stability regardless of the government's preferences, are identified on the basis of a monetary policy narrative and an analysis of a set of qualitative determinants of informal independence. The most important determinants are the social/political acceptance that monetary policy is the sphere of the CB, the existence of anti-inflationary commitments in the form of intermediate targets for monetary policy, the degree of social consensus on the means and ends of macroeconomic policy, and the relative technical expertise of the CB. These broad trends help to explain some of the inflation experience of the 1980s and 1990s, which cannot be understood in terms of changes to formal CBI.     

Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals

In recent years boards have become significantly more likely to implement non-binding, majority-vote (MV) shareholder proposals. Using a sample of 620 MV proposals between 1997 and 2004, we find that shareholder pressure (e.g., the voting outcome and the influence of the proponent) and the type of proposals are the main determinants of the implementation decision, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to affect the decision. We then examine the labor market consequences of the implementation decision for outside directors and find that directors implementing MV shareholder proposals experience a one-fifth reduction in the likelihood of losing their board seat as well as other directorships.     

Discussion of “Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants”

Carter, Ittner and Zechman (2009) examine the use of explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity plans in a sample of United Kingdom (U.K.) firms in 2002. They find that factors suggested by economic theories (for example, removal of common shocks, tournament theory) are more closely associated with specific features of the plan than with the firm-level decision to use an RPE equity plan. My discussion focuses on the interpretation of these findings and the opportunities and implications for future research. I also summarize the views of five U.K. directors who were involved in the design and use of performance-vested equity plans.