CHANGES IN POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper presents new data on poverty, inequality, and growthin those developing countries of the world for which the requisitestatistics are available. Eco-nomic growth is found generallybut not always to reduce poverty. Growth, however, is foundto have very little to do with income inequality. Thus the "economiclaws" linking the rate of growth and the distribution of benefitsreceive only very tenuous empirical support here.      

AN INVESTIGATION OF PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING BY BANK AND NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of announcements of preferred stock issues made by financial institutions. Fixed-rate straight preferred stock and convertible preferred stock issue announcements result in insignificant common share price responses. However, the average stock price reaction to announcements of adjustable-rate preferred stock issues is positive and significant for banking firms. Our findings suggest that banks' common shareholders react positively to adjustable-rate preferred stock issue announcements because such securities provide a relatively low-cost way of increasing the primary capital used to satisfy legal minimum capital requirements without diluting common equity voting rights.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF FORCED WARRANT EXERCISE

We examine stock price reactions to announced calls of in-the-money warrants and find a significant average devaluation in excess of 4 percent, consistent with the recent literature. We test theoretical predictions based on asymmetric information, agency costs, and corporate control in a cross-sectional model of announcement-period returns and find support for voting rights and ownership dilution as an explanation. We find evidence of some price recovery after the call announcement; however, further evidence of a liquidity-based explanation is mixed.     

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance.

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance/benefits in the United States are largely dependent upon the ability of the various stakeholders to successfully argue their positions with legislators, regulators, providers, purchasers and third party beneficiaries. Given the public/private nature of health benefits, these relationships are examined in a Stigler/Posner/Peltzman public choice framework. Conflicts among various stakeholders and their ability to influence innovation in the market for health benefits are discussed.