Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information

We study revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple heterogeneous objects when buyers care about the entire allocation, and not just about the ones they obtain. Buyers’ payoff depends on their cost parameter and, possibly, on their competitors’ costs. Costs are independently distributed across buyers, and both the buyers and the seller are risk-neutral. The formulation allows for complements, substitutes and externalities. We identify a number of novel characteristics of revenue-maximizing mechanisms: First, we find that revenue-maximizing reserve prices depend on the bids of other buyers. Second, we find that when non-participation payoffs are type-dependent, revenue-maximizing auctions may sell too often, or they may even be ex-post efficient.     

On the Economic Contribution of Specialized Higher Education Institutions to the Development of Monofunctional Cities

This article deals with the social, cultural, and economic contributions of universities to the life of small cities in which they are located. Using a questionnaire, we estimated the direct and indirect contributions of students from two universities of the Public Universities System in the state of Oaxaca (Mexico)—SUNEO (Sistema de Universidades Estatales de Oaxaca): the Technological University of the Mixteca (UTM—La Universidad Tecnológica de la Mixteca) and the University of the Costa Region (UNCOS—la Universidad de la Costa) in the life of two cities, Huajuapan de Leon and Pinotepa Nacional, in which these universities are located. The results obtained make it possible to recommend the use of methodologies for developing a strategy for creating a system of universities in monofunctional cities in Russia. The cases of the establishment of universities in small and medium-sized cities of Russia, as well as the factors that contribute to and impede such diversification of the economy of monofunctional cities in the current conditions of applying digital technologies in education are considered.     

Monopoly regulation under asymmetric information: prices versus quantities

We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance. With unknown demand and increasing marginal costs, the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity, whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease. The simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease, but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase. With unknown costs, both instruments are equivalent.