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31.
We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment‐constrained profit maximizers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly. 相似文献
32.
33.
This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty,
economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist
decides to invest early as well as the overall welfare generated by this decision. In a regulated environment, we consider
a vertically integrated network provider that is required to provide access to downstream competitors and compare two distinct
access pricing methodologies: the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR). We
identify the welfare-maximizing access prices using the unregulated market output as a benchmark and show that optimal access
regulation depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of demand) with two possible outcomes: (i) access prices that
provide a positive payoff to the incumbent, that is, provide a positive compensation to account for the option to delay; and
(ii) access prices that yield a zero payoff to the incumbent. Moreover, unlike the earlier literature that argues in favor
of an ECPR-type methodology to account for the interaction between irreversibility and demand uncertainty, we find that, except
under very specific conditions, an access price that accounts for the option to delay value is welfare-superior to the ECPR.
相似文献
34.
We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme. 相似文献
35.
In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline.Received: 12 December 2000, Accepted: 1 May 2002, JEL Classification:
D44Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (Grant A000000055) and CNPq. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support from CNPq and the hospitality of CERSEM where part of this paper has been written. We thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Peter Sørensen and two anonymous referees for useful comments. 相似文献
36.
We define proper strong-Fibonacci (PSF) games as the subset of proper homogeneous weighted majority games which admit a Fibonacci representation. This is a homogeneous, type-preserving representation whose ordered sequence of type weights and winning quota is the initial string of Fibonacci numbers of the one-step delayed Fibonacci sequence. We show that for a PSF game, the Fibonacci representation coincides with the natural representation of the game. A characterization of PSF games is given in terms of their profile. This opens the way up to a straightforward formula which gives the number \(\varPsi (t)\) of such games as a function of t, number of non-dummy players’ types. It turns out that the growth rate of \(\varPsi (t)\) is exponential. The main result of our paper is that, for two consecutive t values of the same parity, the ratio \(\varPsi (t+2)/\varPsi (t)\) converges toward the golden ratio \({\varPhi }\). 相似文献
37.
We discuss the changes occurring in the field of organizational foresight. The analysis results from viewing foresight from two different perspectives: as centered on the future or on the present; as macroscopic analysis or microscopic practice. The combination of these factors results in four different modes of organizational foresight: strategic planning, visioning, scenario thinking and planned emergence. These different perspectives are examined. We contribute to the literature by presenting foresight as a complex process, amenable to different understandings. Foresight is often portrayed as a technical and analytic process. We discuss it as a human process permeated by a dialectic between the need to know and the fear of knowing. 相似文献
38.
Auctions with endogenous participation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their
values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction
since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first-
and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium
where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions
generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature,
the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that
it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions
with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse.
Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct
revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal
to the participation cost.
Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999 相似文献
39.
Mergers in Stackelberg Markets with Efficiency Gains 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
40.
Misleadership is defined as leadership process involving a complex interplay of leader, follower, and situational elements, inscribing a vicious circle of intensifying dysfunctional action. It is tempting to see misleadership as the result of the madness of one leader. It is also misleading. Leadership research has been insufficiently attentive to misleadership and, in particular, to the misleadership factors intervening in genocidal processes. Discussed in the current article are the antecedents and the rule of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the 1970s as an extreme case of misleadership. Lessons from the Polpotist dystopia are derived and reflections on possible contra‐strategies are presented. In particular, it is suggested that it is necessary to distinguish measures for social change that are admissible and positive, from negative utopian visions that are negative, inadmissible, and facilitative of evil leadership. 相似文献