Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations

The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a response to the problem of adaptive preferences. Their argument says that people might adapt to certain unfavorable circumstances and any self-evaluation in terms of satisfaction or happiness will in this case necessarily be distorted. To evaluate people's well-being in terms of functionings and capabilities guarantees a more objective picture of people's life. Next to this strong criticism on subjective measurements of well-being, we observe an increasing interest in Subjective Well-Being (SWB) or Happiness studies that are included in the broader field of Hedonic Psychology. In this paper, we thus revise the original critique of adaptive preferences and compare it with a more detailed analysis of adaptation as it is presented in hedonic psychology. It becomes clear that adaptation can be a positive as well as a negative phenomenon and that the adaptive preference critique had a particular narrow view on adaptation. However, this does not mean SWB-research is not any longer susceptible to this critique. An alternative way to assess people's subjective well-being, but which could be considered to be more in line with the CA, is proposed by Daniel Kahneman's Objective Happiness. These are all relatively new considerations, especially in economics. Therefore much more research needs to be done on the positive and negative aspects of adaptation to understand its consequences on well-being – especially when evaluated within the capability-space.     

Binary games with many players

Summary. We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual’s payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 24 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D02, D49, L19.Flavio M. Menezes: Correspondence toThis paper has benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the ANU, Boston University, Harvard University Law, Economics and Organization Seminar, University of Wisconsin and at the Econometrics Society Australasian Meetings, Auckland New Zealand. We also thank Lucian Bebchuk, Eddie Dekel, Oliver Hart, Luis Kaplov, Paulo Monteiro and John Quiggin for very useful comments. All errors are our own. Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (grant no. 00000055) and the hospitality of EPGE/FGV and RSPAS/ANU.     

Su Una Estensione Bidimensionale del Teorema di Scomposizione di Peccati

Facendo ricorso all’introduzione di una opportuna condizione di sincronia fra due coppie di tassi (i, j), esterna, e (i*, j*), interna, si dimostra che condizione necessaria e sufficiente per la validità finanzíaria di una estensione hidimensionale del teorema di scomposizione di Peccati è che le due coppie (i, j) e (i*, j*) soddisfino tale proprietà di sincronia.

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A two-dimensional extension of peccati’s decomposition theorem

Summary This paper keeps as starting poing the Peccati’s decomposition of the d.c.f. of an enterpreneural project seen as a present value of single-period results, recently given by the author in an unidimensional framework. The goal of the paper is twofold: the first is to provide a bidimensional extension of the decomposition in order to keep account of mixed projects, that is projects that according to any internal couple (i*, j*) reveal alternance of investment and respectively collection periods. A straightforward extension is given on the basis of a simple analogic argument. But a more careful evaluation of the problem suggests that if we require that the decomposition be meaningful from a financial point of view. things are no more simple either in one or in two dimensions. To solve the problem we introduce a proper synchrony condition: precisely, the pair of couples (i, j) and (i*, j*) are said to satisfy the synchrony condition if and only if the sequences of the signs of the partial balancesM _t (i, j) andM _t (i*, j*) are the same. After that we are able to show that, with reference to a couple (i, j) of external rates, a bidimensional decomposition centered on an internal couple (i*, j*) is meaningful if and only if the pair (i, j) and (i*, j*) satisfy the synchrony condition. Formally, the result comes as a nice byproduct of a rule on the factorization of particular bivariate polynomials recently given by Stucchi. In particular going back to a one-dimensional world, it turns out that for pure investment (Soper) projects the synchrony condition works as a condition of applicability of the Peccati’s decomposition.

Il testo è frutto di una riflessione congiunta degli autori che ne condividono l’impostazione generale e i risultati. In dettaglio, la stesura dell’introduzione e delle conclusioni deriva da una claborazione comune, quella dei paragrafi 4, 5 e 7 è dovuta a Pressacco mentre quella dei rimanenti è dovuta a Stucchi. Il lavoro è stato svolto nell’ambito della ricerca nazionale “Modelli per la Finanza Matematica”.     

Understanding Social Market Economy,Francesco Forte and His Interpretation

The social thought which emerges from Francesco Forte’s economic writings proves to be mainly inspired by methodological individualism, though interpreted through a peculiar “personalistic” key. We will analyze the peculiar traits of his thought and the specific contribution that Forte gave to the understanding of a specific economic theory based on the doctrine of “Ordoliberalism” or the “Freiburg School.” In our work, we will show how Forte proposes an interpretation of that doctrine, according to two of his main points of reference in economic and philosophical thought: Luigi Einaudi and Antonio Rosmini Serbati. Finally, we will present an important aspect of Forte’s work: his institutional analysis in the light of the particular civil philosophy expressed by Christian social teaching.     

Assessing dependence between financial market indexes using conditional time-varying copulas: applications to Value at Risk (VaR)

We analyse the dynamic dependence structure between broad stock market indexes from the United States (S&P500), Britain (FTSE100), Brazil (BOVESPA) and Mexico (PCMX). We employ Patton’s [Int. Econ. Rev., 2006, 2, 527–556] conditional copula setting and additionally observe the impact of different copula functions on Value at Risk (VaR) estimation. We conclude that the dependence between BOVESPA and the other indexes has intensified since the beginning of 2007. In our case the particular copula form is not crucial for VaR estimation. A goodness-of-fit test based on the parametric bootstrap is also applied. The best fits are obtained via time constant Student-t and time-varying Normal copulas.     

Poverty and the Atkinson BI/FRT model: A note

By endogenizing an income-oriented poverty line in Atkinson’s (1995) model, welfare maximizing conditions for a basic income/flat rate tax scheme in economies with income poverty are derived and briefly discussed. (JEL: I38)     

Auctions with options to re-auction

A seller has one unit to sell using an English auction mechanism similar to internet auction markets, such as eBay. Bidders appear according to a random arrival process. The seller chooses a reserve price and duration for each auction. If the reserve is not met, the seller passes in the object and conducts another auction with a new, randomly chosen, set of bidders. We distinguish reserves that embody an institutional commitment not to sell below that price, from those that do not. In each case, we find the optimal reserve price and the optimal auction duration. Without price commitment, the equilibrium reserve is too low for allocative efficiency, whereas the optimal reserve with commitment is shown to be too high when the distribution of bidder valuations exhibits an increasing hazard rate. It might even be socially preferable to allow reserve price commitments. With respect to duration, a version of the Diamond paradox afflicts sellers who cannot commit to price; auctions facilitate valuable duration commitments that increase buyer competition and raise expected revenue. With commitment, price posting (equivalent to a zero-length auction) is the dominant selling mechanism.     

THE IDENTIFICATION AND ECONOMIC CONTENT OF ORDERED CHOICE MODELS WITH STOCHASTIC THRESHOLDS*

This article extends the widely used ordered choice model by introducing stochastic thresholds and interval‐specific outcomes. The model can be interpreted as a generalization of the GAFT (MPH) framework for discrete duration data that jointly models durations and outcomes associated with different stopping times. We establish conditions for nonparametric identification. We interpret the ordered choice model as a special case of a general discrete choice model and as a special case of a dynamic discrete choice model.     

An efficient binomial method for pricing¶American options

We present a new method for obtaining fast and accurate estimates of the price of an American put option by binomial trees. The method is based on the interpolation of suitable values obtained by modifying the contractual strike. A time-saving procedure allows us to derive all the interpolating data from a unique standard backward procedure. Received: 16 July 2001 / Accepted: 19 April 2002 {The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank Antonino Zanette for his help in the refinements of the numerical procedures.