Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline.Received: 12 December 2000, Accepted: 1 May 2002, JEL Classification: D44Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (Grant A000000055) and CNPq. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support from CNPq and the hospitality of CERSEM where part of this paper has been written. We thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Peter Sørensen and two anonymous referees for useful comments.     

Proper strong-Fibonacci games

We define proper strong-Fibonacci (PSF) games as the subset of proper homogeneous weighted majority games which admit a Fibonacci representation. This is a homogeneous, type-preserving representation whose ordered sequence of type weights and winning quota is the initial string of Fibonacci numbers of the one-step delayed Fibonacci sequence. We show that for a PSF game, the Fibonacci representation coincides with the natural representation of the game. A characterization of PSF games is given in terms of their profile. This opens the way up to a straightforward formula which gives the number \(\varPsi (t)\) of such games as a function of t, number of non-dummy players’ types. It turns out that the growth rate of \(\varPsi (t)\) is exponential. The main result of our paper is that, for two consecutive t values of the same parity, the ratio \(\varPsi (t+2)/\varPsi (t)\) converges toward the golden ratio \({\varPhi }\).     

Su Una Estensione Bidimensionale del Teorema di Scomposizione di Peccati

Facendo ricorso all’introduzione di una opportuna condizione di sincronia fra due coppie di tassi (i, j), esterna, e (i*, j*), interna, si dimostra che condizione necessaria e sufficiente per la validità finanzíaria di una estensione hidimensionale del teorema di scomposizione di Peccati è che le due coppie (i, j) e (i*, j*) soddisfino tale proprietà di sincronia.

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A two-dimensional extension of peccati’s decomposition theorem

Summary This paper keeps as starting poing the Peccati’s decomposition of the d.c.f. of an enterpreneural project seen as a present value of single-period results, recently given by the author in an unidimensional framework. The goal of the paper is twofold: the first is to provide a bidimensional extension of the decomposition in order to keep account of mixed projects, that is projects that according to any internal couple (i*, j*) reveal alternance of investment and respectively collection periods. A straightforward extension is given on the basis of a simple analogic argument. But a more careful evaluation of the problem suggests that if we require that the decomposition be meaningful from a financial point of view. things are no more simple either in one or in two dimensions. To solve the problem we introduce a proper synchrony condition: precisely, the pair of couples (i, j) and (i*, j*) are said to satisfy the synchrony condition if and only if the sequences of the signs of the partial balancesM _t (i, j) andM _t (i*, j*) are the same. After that we are able to show that, with reference to a couple (i, j) of external rates, a bidimensional decomposition centered on an internal couple (i*, j*) is meaningful if and only if the pair (i, j) and (i*, j*) satisfy the synchrony condition. Formally, the result comes as a nice byproduct of a rule on the factorization of particular bivariate polynomials recently given by Stucchi. In particular going back to a one-dimensional world, it turns out that for pure investment (Soper) projects the synchrony condition works as a condition of applicability of the Peccati’s decomposition.

Il testo è frutto di una riflessione congiunta degli autori che ne condividono l’impostazione generale e i risultati. In dettaglio, la stesura dell’introduzione e delle conclusioni deriva da una claborazione comune, quella dei paragrafi 4, 5 e 7 è dovuta a Pressacco mentre quella dei rimanenti è dovuta a Stucchi. Il lavoro è stato svolto nell’ambito della ricerca nazionale “Modelli per la Finanza Matematica”.     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

The cooperation strategies for the performance improvement in the cruise sea–land logistics: evidence from Italy

Quality & Quantity - This paper aims to measure the terminal’s performance in the cruise sea–land logistics using the methodology of stochastic frontier analysis. A 10-year study...     

An efficient binomial method for pricing¶American options

We present a new method for obtaining fast and accurate estimates of the price of an American put option by binomial trees. The method is based on the interpolation of suitable values obtained by modifying the contractual strike. A time-saving procedure allows us to derive all the interpolating data from a unique standard backward procedure. Received: 16 July 2001 / Accepted: 19 April 2002 {The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank Antonino Zanette for his help in the refinements of the numerical procedures.