Family Business Restructuring: A Review and Research Agenda

Although business restructuring occurs frequently and it is important for the prosperity of family firms across generations, research on family firms has largely evolved separately from research on business restructuring. This is a missed opportunity, since the two domains are complementary, and understanding the context, process, content, and outcome dimensions is relevant to both research streams. We address this by examining the intersection between research on business restructuring and family firms to improve our knowledge of each area and inform future research. To achieve this goal, we review and organize research across different dimensions to create an integrative framework. Building on current research, we focus on 88 studies at the intersection of family firm and business restructuring research to develop a model that identifies research needs and suggests directions for future research.     

Institutions of conflict management and economic growth revisited: a short note

We study the effects of institutions of conflict management like corporatism, trust, civic norms and group membership on economic growth. By employing Schneider and Wagner’s (Kyklos 54:509–532, 2001) model and data from 1990–2011, we show that corporatism has (still) a positive coordination effect and a negative rent-seeking effect. The total effect is positive for most countries.     

Learning-by-exporting versus self-selection: New evidence for 19 sub-Saharan African countries

We examine learning-by-exporting effects of manufacturing and services firms in 19 sub-Saharan African countries. Comparing several outlier-robust estimators, our results provide evidence for positive effects in the manufacturing sector when using the MM estimator, but not in the services sector.     

Regulating harmless activity to fight crime

This paper establishes that regulating harmless activity can be an effective instrument of law enforcement when the harmless activity and the harmful activity are interdependent. This type of regulation is not without cost, as it distorts the individual choices made by both law-abiding and non-law-abiding individuals. However, it can be socially advantageous when the impact on welfare resulting from changes in the choices of offenders dominates the impact of changes in non-offenders’ decisions; in addition, increasing deterrence by other means (such as raising the probability of detection or the magnitude of sanctions) can incur much higher costs.     

A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross‐subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs. We show that the Miyazaki–Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome.     

On the Edge of Buying: A Targeting Approach for Indecisive Buyers Based on Willingness-to-Pay Ranges

Targeting the “right” consumers is a core part of marketing. Whereas existing techniques to identify these consumers use demographic or psychographic variables or behaviors such as response probabilities, a proposed new targeting approach builds on consumers’ incremental responses to identify them by their willingness-to-pay (WTP) ranges. These WTP ranges reveal a consumer as a definite buyer, a definite non-buyer, or an indecisive buyer. The proposed theoretical framework indicates that indecisive buyers offer the highest incremental responses to targeted marketing mix activities and thus should be the most preferred targeting group. A sequence of three laboratory experimental studies validates the proposed approach for targeted price discounts and non-price tactics. In addition, a large-scale field experiment involving a consumer engagement campaign that includes observed purchase behavior demonstrates the high external validity and applicability of this approach.     

A temporal analysis of how entrepreneurial goal intentions,positive fantasies,and action planning affect starting a new venture and when the effects wear off

The road from intentions to actions and new venture creation is long. So far, the literature has provided insights into action-regulatory factors that contribute to new venture creation. However, the literature has neglected to take into account the temporal dynamics underlying these relationships. We contribute to action-regulation theories in entrepreneurship by theorizing about and investigating how the effects of action-regulatory factors hold over time. We hypothesize that the action-regulatory factors of entrepreneurial goal intentions, positive fantasies, and action planning have combined effects on new venture creation. Furthermore, we hypothesize that these effects become weaker over time. To test our hypotheses, we studied 96 Ugandan entrepreneurs over 30 months. Our results supported our hypotheses. Action planning moderated the effects of entrepreneurial goal intentions and positive fantasies on new venture creation. Furthermore, the effects were significant in the beginning and wore off over time. Our study shows that including a time frame in theoretical models is important to derive valid conclusions from empirical results and to develop more precise theories.     

On the evasion of employment protection legislation

This paper analyzes how the option to evade employment protection legislation impacts on unemployment. Using a stylized model, it is established that the level of unemployment is non-monotonous in the degree of strictness with which employment protection legislation is enforced. Considering just cause and social criteria requirements for three regulatory regimes representative of a large number of industrialized countries, we find that different regimes generate different dismissal decisions only if the regimes are strictly enforced. In contrast, unemployment rates may differ across regimes even in the case of weak enforcement. Additionally, we find that it may be worse for the economy to weakly enforce harmful regulations than to strictly enforce them.     

Why don’t they answer? Unit non-response in the IAB establishment panel

The paper proposed focuses on the unit-nonresponse in the IAB (Institute for Employment Research) Establishment Panel, a comprehensive data set describing the employer side of the labour market in Germany. Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed the same establishments from all branches and different size categories in western (eastern) Germany. Although great efforts are taken to convince the owner/manager to take part in the survey there are always firms that do not answer the questionnaire. In this paper the authors try to find out why some establishments are not willing or able to respond to the questionnaire. If the respondent has the authority to provide relevant information, is able to give reliable answers to the questions with a justifiable amount of effort and is interested in the survey in business terms, participation is less frequently refused. The results also confirm the central significance of the interaction between the respondent and the interviewer. If one of the two individuals changes, the probability of further participation falls clearly.     

SPAC merger announcement returns and subsequent performance

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are created to raise capital and then find non-listed operating companies with which to merge. While most of the extant research has focused on SPAC initial public offerings, we study what happens when SPACs announce business combinations. Our analysis of 236 ‘deSPACs’ completed between January 2012 and June 2021 in the United States documents an average short-term announcement return of +7.4% and a 1-year abnormal return of −14.1% (−18.0% over 2 years) for public investors beginning from the merger announcement. Short-term returns decrease with longer times from initial public offering until announcement.