Corporate Social Responsibility,Product Differentiation Strategy and Export Performance

This article examines why an organization might wish to manage workplace romance, and describes a number of alternative approaches to managing dating. At first sight the ethics of dating bans balances the need to protect female employees from harassment against employee rights to privacy and freedom of association – a rights versus rights issue. However, dating bans seem not to be directed at protecting female employees from harm, but rather protect employers from sexual harassment liability claims – an employer self-interest versus employee rights issue. This article advocates a consequentialist approach to the problem, via the factoring in of other harms caused by prohibiting workplace romance. Given that most workplace romances end up in marriage or long-term partnerships, a ban on workplace romance is argued to be antisocial. The incidence of sexual harassment is very low in comparison to the number of long-term relationships initiated in the workplace. This article concludes by citing examples of firms that encourage romance, showing that is feasible to manage any resulting problems within these firms’ existing conflict of interest and sexual harassment rules.     

Contrasting the Behavioural Business Ethics Approach and the Institutional Economic Approach to Business Ethics: Insights From the Study of Quaker Employers

The article suggests that in a modern context, where value pluralism is a prevailing and possibly, even ethically desirable interaction condition, institutional economics provides a more viable business ethics than behavioural business ethics, such as Kantianism or religious ethics. The article explains how the institutional economic approach to business ethics analyses morality with regard to an interaction process, and favours non-behavioural, situational intervention with incentive structures and with capital exchange. The article argues that this approach may have to be prioritised over behavioural business ethics, which tends to analyse morality at the level of the individual and favours behavioural intervention with the individual’s value, norm and belief system, e.g. through ethical pedagogy, communicative techniques, etc. Quaker ethics is taken as an example of behavioural ethics. The article concludes that through the conceptual grounding of behavioural ethics in the economic approach, theoretical and practical limitations of behavioural ethics, as encountered in a modern context, can be relaxed. Probably only then can behavioural ethics still contribute to raising moral standards in interactions amongst the members (stakeholders) of a single firm, and equally, amongst (the stakeholders of) different firms. Dr. Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto is researcher in business ethics, organisational economics and economic issues that concern the Old Testament. He is placed at the School of Management of the University of Leicester, UK. He holds two doctorates, one in social studies from the University of Oxford, UK, and one in economic studies from the Catholic University of Eichstaett, Germany. He has widely published on green consumerism and institutional economic issues that concern organization theory, business ethics theory and an economic interpretation of the Old Testament. His publications include the books Understanding Green Consumer Behaviour (Routledge, 2003) and Human Nature and Organization Theory (Edward Elgar, 2003).     

Competitive Bluffing: An Examination of a Common Practice and its Relationship with Performance

Bluffing, a common and consequential form of competitive behavior, has been comparably ignored in the management literature, even though misleading one’s rivals is suggested to be an advantageous skill in a multifaceted and highly competitive environment. To address this deficiency and advance scholarship on competitive dynamics, our study investigates the moral reasoning behind competitive bluffing and, using a simulated market-entry game, examines the performance effects of bluffing. Findings suggest that decision makers’ views on the ethicality of bluffing competitors differ from their beliefs on the ethicality of misleading other organizational stakeholders. Analysis also indicates that decision makers who view competitor bluffing as more ethical (less unethical) are more willing to engage in competitive bluffing. Finally, while bluffing is often thought to be an effective business practice, results show that in the context of repeated interaction, bluffing is not conducive to high levels of performance and, in fact, can have undesirable consequences.     

ERP On Demand Platform

Platforms for SaaS-based enterprise applications are prospering and the number of on-demand ERP vendors is increasing. We combine both phenomena for the first time and illustrate how the integration of a sustainability benchmarking service into an on-demand ERP platform provides added value beyond pure cost savings. By applying a qualitative system dynamics approach we identify self-reinforcing mechanisms which allow a faster and more comprehensive market penetration compared to providing these services separately.     

Institutional theory and global entrepreneurship: exploring differences between factor- versus innovation-driven countries

Using the lenses of institutional theory, this study examines several Entrepreneurial Factor Conditions (National Experts Survey database) while focusing on potential differences of several institutional dimensions between factor- (or production) and innovation-driven countries. This study therefore examines first the extent to which several Scott’s institutional variables (normative, regulative, and cultural-cognitive) differ according to the economic structure of countries participating in NES-GEM. Results indicate that the relevance of both regulative and cultural-cognitive dimensions differ between the group of countries driven by factor (or production) versus innovation, with a single exception, the normative dimension. Second, the study fine tunes the analysis and examines the extent to which the relevance of the aforementioned dimensions differs in two distinct institutional contexts (Portugal and Angola). Results show that the relevance of all institutional variables is different except one, the basic education and training. A possible explanation for these results may be associated to the lack of and fragility of several institutions and the absence of norms and regulations needed for a well-functioning economy, particularly in what concerns the factor (or production)-driven countries. In terms of originality, the study addresses an area of the GEM model that is under-researched.     

Four Design Criteria for any Future Contractarian Theory of Business Ethics

This article assesses the quality of Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) as a social contract argument. For this purpose, it embarks on a comparative analysis of the use of the social contract model as a theory of political authority and as a theory of social justice. Building on this comparison, it then develops four criteria for any future contractarian theory of business ethics (CBE). To apply the social contract model properly to the domain of business ethics, it should be: (1) self-disciplined, i.e., not aspire results beyond what the contract model can realistically establish; (2) argumentative, i.e., it should seek to provide principles that are demonstrative results of the contractarian method; (3) task-directed, i.e., it should be clear what the social contract thought-experiment is intended to model; and (4) domain-specific, i.e., the contractarian choice situation should be tailored to the defining problems of business ethics.     

Normativity in Environmental Reporting: A Comparison of Three Regimes

Normativity is assessed as we evaluate and compare the environmental reporting practices of a sample of French and Canadian companies through the lens of institutional legitimacy. More specifically, we examine how French and Canadian firms changed their reporting practices in reaction to the promulgation of laws and regulations in their respective countries, i.e., the NER and Grenelle II Acts in France, and National Instrument 51-102 and CSA Staff Notice NR 51-333, issued by the Canadian Securities Administrators. The firms’ voluntary disclosures according to GRI guidelines are also investigated. Substantive legitimacy theory is used to explore the level of substantive disclosures provided by Canadian and French firms. The findings reveal that the French parliamentary regime is more successful than the Canadian stock exchange regulation in triggering environmental reporting, and that the GRI combined with local regimes prompts environmental disclosures. Notwithstanding the improvements in environmental reporting under all three regimes, a very low level of substantive disclosure is noted in both countries.     

Are large portions always bad? Using the Delboeuf illusion on food packaging to nudge consumer behavior

Exaggerated portion sizes are generally pictured on the front of product packaging in order to stimulate food craving and encourage consumer purchasing decisions. However, one problem with such images is that they can set inappropriate norms as far as food consumption is concerned and hence result in people serving themselves more than they otherwise might. The research reported here builds on the fact that depicting a food portion in a smaller (vs. larger) container (i.e., plate or bowl) creates the illusion of a larger (vs. smaller) portion, although the actual quantity of food remains the same (this is known as the Delboeuf illusion). Here, we demonstrate in two experiments that by presenting food in a smaller container (thus giving rise to the illusion of a relatively larger portion), participants have higher purchase intentions (study 1) and perceive the food as being more appetizing (study 2) but, crucially, decrease the size of the portion that they serve themselves (studies 1 and 2). Overall, by giving the impression of a larger portion on product packaging, the Delboeuf illusion could potentially be used to nudge consumers to find food more desirable, while at the same time leading them to reduce their serving, thus potentially benefitting both consumers and the food industry.     

Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives,returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micro-modeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.