Does Tax Competition Reduce Corruption?

A vast literature asserts that competition among jurisdictions can mitigate corruption. However, empirical studies do not fully support such a conventional view. This paper points out a drawback of the conventional view, that is, it ignores the role played by the owners of immobile factors. Within a standard tax competition model, we amend the conventional view by incorporating the lobbying of the immobile factor owners, and show that fiscal decentralization can aggravate corruption. We also demonstrate that social welfare can be higher under decentralization than under centralization in some cases, whereas the immobile factor owners' lobbying will prevent such a superiority of decentralization from being the outcome. Moreover, we provide an example to show that a better policy outcome and a higher level of corruption can co‐exist, which contrasts with the general belief.     

Timing the Start of Material Substitution Projects: Creating Switching Options under Volatile Material Prices

Firms developing new products often face the challenge of making investment decisions under uncertain input–cost conditions due to the price volatilities of the materials they use. These decisions need to be made long before the final products are launched on the market. Therefore, firms that invest in the opportunity to switch materials in a timely manner will have the flexibility to react to material price changes and realize competitive advantages. However, volatile material prices may also cause a firm to delay investment. Using real‐options reasoning, this paper studies the influence of input‐cost fluctuations on the timing decision to start new product development (NPD) and thus create the follow‐on opportunity to later replace an existing product. A model that combines waiting and switching options to derive influencing factors of the flexibility value that triggers the investment is developed and tested on a sample of material substitution projects from manufacturing firms. The results show how price uncertainty of the new and the old material, their joint price development, the expected project duration, and competitive preemption are related to the propensity to delay the start of NPD. The findings provide new insights on how timing in adopting materials can be used to hedge exposure to volatile material prices. The insights are relevant for adopters and producers of new materials, as well as for policy makers who strive for supporting the diffusion of new materials.     

Health,Education and Emergence from the Development Trap

Abstract: This paper studies the emergence of developing countries from a development trap. It shows that countries whose dynamics exhibits several growth peaks can be considered as cases of equilibrium jump. Applying this criterion to a sample of 65 countries that were initially very poor in 1950, it identifies 13 such countries, called ‘emerging economies’. Comparing emerging and non‐emerging economies in the 1950s and early 1960s, it shows that economic take‐offs starting in the 1960s can be related to health and education in the early 1950s, while other possible factors, such as savings, openness and democracy are not significant.     

Are Trade Preferences more Effective than Aid in Supporting Exports? Evidence from the ‘Everything But Arms’ Preference Scheme

This study examines the effect of the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) trade preferences regime on exports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) to the European Union (EU). With this aim, an augmented gravity model is estimated for exports from the 79 ACP countries to the EU‐15 for the time period of 1995—2013 using panel data techniques. The results are used to quantify the effect of the eligibility for EBA preferences on the export performance of the ACP least developed countries (LDCs) and to relate it to the impact of official development assistance on exports. In addition to their separate effects, the combined impact of EBA and aid flows is examined. The main results do not provide evidence for an additional positive effect of the EBA agreement on the export performance of the ACP LDCs. However, receiving aid shows a significant and positive effect on exports from EBA‐eligible ACP countries to the EU‐15, supporting an EU development strategy that includes both sorts of assistance, aid and trade preferences.