Managing Competing Institutional Logics in Public–Private Joint Ventures

Abstract

Cross-sector inter-organizational partnerships, alliances and networks have become extremely popular. Yet, we may expect competing societal-level institutional logics to play an important role in cross-sector alliances, hence making their management central to alliance success. This article responds to the general research question: How do participants of public–private joint ventures manage competing institutional logics? Based on in-depth interviews we empirically characterize two competing logics in a cross-sector collaborative and identify two practices used to cope with them.     

The end of growth in residential tourism destinations: steady state or sustainable development? The case of Calpe

This article discusses how the slowdown in the real estate market during the most recent economic and financial crisis has affected residential tourism destinations on the Spanish coast. The afore-mentioned crisis, which gave rise to a standstill in residential activity, coincided with the turbulences experienced in the competing destinations of Northern Africa, which brought about a record number of international tourist arrivals to Spain. The resulting situation enables us to explore the future scenario of all the Spanish destinations that, due to the depletion of available land, are reaching their maximum levels of urban growth. Examining the case of Calpe, a destination which is representative of the Spanish Mediterranean, the study analyses whether the foreseeable dynamics for the future are conceptualized in the favourable terms that characterize “sustainable development” or, on the contrary, exhibit negative implications which the classic economists refer to as the “steady state”.     

A synthesis of the Heckscher-Ohlin and the neoclassical models of international trade

In this paper we provide a synthesis between the neoclassical and the Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade by developing the properties of a two-sector, three-factor model. The neoclassical model, where one or more factors are specific to one or both industries, and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, where two (or all factors) are nonspecific, then can be analyzed as special cases of our model. The theorems by Rybczynski, Stolper and Samuelson, Jones and Chipman, among others, are reexamined in terms of our generalized model.     

Democracy,Cooperation and Business Success: The Case of Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa

Are democracy and success compatible in a business organization? In this work we show how Spain’s Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa (MCC) has made it possible. MCC can be considered a world leader in cooperativism. It is one of the few contemporary business organizations that can be viewed as a democracy, and it represents a unique experience in the use of democratic and participatory methods in management. MCC has developed its own Management Model based on its cooperative principles, on modern management practices and on the cutting edge experiences of the most advanced companies. In this work we analyze the key elements of MCC’s democratic management model, developed around aspects such as corporate culture, organizational structure or human resources. We also look at the case of Irizar, a component cooperative of MCC internationally known for its successful management model. Finally, we outline some practical implications of introducing democracy into organizations, drawn from the experiences of MCC and Irizar.     

Do Business Groups Change With Market Development?

Khanna and Yafeh hypothesize that business groups should be more common in economies with less developed markets and institutions. We test the time‐series version of this hypothesis by looking at changes in Chilean groups over 20 years (1990–2009). In this period, Chile experienced a deep economic transformation as measured by common proxies of market development (e.g., per capita income doubled). Despite this dramatic transformation, groups remained mostly unchanged in terms of relative size, industrial diversification, vertical integration, control structures, internal capital markets, and reliance on external funds (minority equity plus debt). Only leverage increased. Also, groups' initial conditions were uncorrelated with market development at the time of formation. This evidence casts doubts on the institutional‐voids hypothesis, although more subtle institutional voids, not captured by the type of macro proxies we use, might explain the existence and resilience of business groups.     

Demand bargaining in legislatures

We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands. In contrast to the case where proposals consist of complete sharing profiles, this content of proposals prevents implicit side-payments inside the committee, and so non-discriminatory outcomes might be expected. We show that in some settings this is the case and the surplus is universally shared.