An alternative approach for portfolio performance evaluation: enabling fund evaluation relative to peer group via Malkiel’s monkey

We propose an implementable portfolio performance evaluation procedure that compares a portfolio with respect to the portfolios constructed by an infinite number of Malkiel’s blindfolded monkeys, or equivalently the whole enumeration of all possible portfolios. We argue that this approach exhibits two main advantages. First, it does not require any benchmark portfolios because a portfolio is being compared to an infinite number of portfolios. Second, it is market condition invariant. Since the market conditions are already reflected in the portfolio performances of an infinite blindfolded monkeys, our measure of portfolio performances is invariant to volatile market conditions.     

Leaving EMU: a real options perspective

The real option implicit in a country's decision of whether to leave an existing monetary union when there is uncertainty over the future benefits of this move is examined. The theoretical model used is calibrated for the current Euro-12 area by proxying policymakers’ inflation preferences with unemployment rates and debt-to-GDP ratios. A robust group of countries is observed that would choose to remain within EMU consisting of Belgium, Finland, Greece and Italy; France and Spain loosely also belong to this core. Only Luxembourg would robustly want to leave EMU; Ireland and The Netherlands, however, complement that core closely.     

Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.     

Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core

Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991.