Energy Prices and Carbon Taxes under Uncertainty about Global Warming

This paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers’ welfare for uncertainty: global warming follows an Itô -process. Stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version. The unconstrained (= reversible) case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case. Nevertheless interesting analytical properties (e.g. about when to stop emissions, implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply) are derived and complemented by a numerical example.     

The impact of introducing seven-day-trading on the Austrian electricity market

This paper analyses the impacts of the new daily green electricity production forecasting policy by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the newly introduced seven-day electricity trading mechanism by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) on the Austrian electricity market. By treating these two market policy alterations as natural experiments and applying statistical and econometric methods to a unique data set, it is investigated whether thereby (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties and (ii) a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower net costs is attained. Furthermore, we analyse whether (iii) seven-day-trading helps to mitigate the Friday-Monday effect that is often observed on stock and other exchanges markets. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the underlying market design might tempt OEMAG to systematically overstate its forecasts on green power generation.     

Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer’s effort matters

This paper investigates the different terms of strategic interactions (non-cooperative, simultaneous move): wholesale versus retail pricing—between Bertrand competing retailers and an upstream oligopoly. The crucial extension is that retailers can play a significant role and this can turn conventional wisdom upside down, e.g.: retail competition need not benefit the upstream firms and wholesale pricing can dominate retail pricing in spite of double marginalization because of the incentives it provides to retailers. In addition, the consequences are investigated of differentiating both pricing instruments either at the downstream (this is motivated by Apple’s entry into the ebook market) or at the upstream level.