Knowledge Disclosure and Transmission in Buyer–Supplier Relationships

A buyer’s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one’s own rival due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive to transmit and, anticipating that, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.      

Optimal investment and production decisions and the value of the firm

We explore the effects of uncertainty on a firm that can respond by modifying its investment or production schedule (or both simultaneously) to variations in output price. Investment may increase capacity and/or reduce costs. We consider a firm with finite resources.Our model uses option theory instead of the more traditional net present value framework. One of the early papers using this approach is Brennan and Schwartz (1985) in which an investment project to extract a finite natural resource is valued. In that paper, the value of the firm is a function of two state variables, the finite resource to be extracted (output to be produced in the future) and the commodity spot price. In order to maximize firm value, the manager can respond by modifying one control variable, the production level. In our model we handle instead three state variables (spot price, resources, accumulated investment) and two control variables (production rate and investment rate), and solve numerically.We obtain both the value and the optimal policy of a firm that has investment projects that increase capacity and/or reduce costs and illustrate optimal policies as resources and available investments decrease over the life of the firm. Firms may start by only investing, then invest and produce, to end only producing.We thank Scott Wo, the referee and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Cortázar and Lowener acknowledge the financial support from FONDECYT and FONDER.     

Übernivellierung der Einnahmen aus der Grunderwerbsteuer im künftigen Finanzausgleich

Fiscal Equalisation in Germany provides substantial fiscal redistribution between federal and state and among state governments. However, there is also a degree of tax autonomy for the individual German states. Since 2007, states can adjust their local rate of the Real Estate Transfer Tax. However, if they keep the rate low, they may suffer revenue losses due to fiscal redistribution. The paper considers whether this effect will also be present in the new rules for fiscal equalization which will come in to effect in 2020.     

Service innovation as a political process

Service innovation processes are driven by stakeholders in interaction and are understood and sketched as a value negotiation process that consists of an iterative process of securing potential value in service. While previous research has focused on service innovation as a harmonious closed system, our study explores service innovation as a political process in which stakeholders negotiate to create and secure future value. Data are collected through interviews and participant observations in four different case studies. Our study contributes to the field by illuminating service innovation as a political process and explaining how this is operationalized. The findings also contribute to an understanding of how stakeholder resources impact a chosen strategy; the resulting strategy’s impact on the service concept vis-à-vis its potential value; and how several involved stakeholders formulate, negotiate, and secure future potential value, which are the activities that drive a service innovation process.     

Duality for pathwise superhedging in continuous time

Finance and Stochastics - We provide a model-free pricing–hedging duality in continuous time. For a frictionless market consisting of $d$  risky assets with continuous price...