Political Leadership,Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace

The emphasis in constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and as a result lower levels of welfare, this paper attempts to analyse why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. The key idea is that expressively motivated group members may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be found, would the expressive perspective alter the conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of constitutional reform that should be undertaken?     

The battle for the essence of entrepreneurship

Nicolai Foss and Peter Klein have penned a most remarkable book on the theory of the firm. They offer a rich analysis of the economic organization through the lenses of various approaches including Austrian economics and neo-institutional economics. Their work is a welcome addition to the field of entrepreneurship studies, as it focuses on the role of entrepreneurship within established organizations. While I embrace most of the authors’ conclusions, I disagree with a central piece of their analysis: The rejection of the Kirznerian framework. In establishing judgment as the fundamental explanans of the theory of entrepreneurship, Foss and Klein introduce the bias of seeing entrepreneurship as allocating resources in firms. Moreover, introducing the process of judgment does not offer new insights that cannot be obtained through Kirznerian discovery analysis. Fundamentally, the essence of entrepreneurship is at stake. And it is not a debate about semantics. It is my contention that Israel Kirzner offers a more fundamental theory of entrepreneurship — one that can be applied within and beyond the realm of the firm, and that helps us explain social change, market processes, development, and growth.     

Excess Returns to R&D-Intensive Firms

Recent studies indicate that both current R&D investment levels and current or recent changes in R&D investment are positively associated with subsequent excess (risk-adjusted) stock returns. The tentative explanation offered for these results is that shares of R&D-intensive firms are mispriced because investors fail to see through earnings distortions caused by conservative accounting for R&D costs. However, an alternative explanation is that conventional controls for risk do not completely capture the riskiness of R&D-intensive firms, causing measured excess returns for these firms to be biased upward. This study provides evidence useful for distinguishing between the mispricing and risk explanations for R&D-related excess returns. Overall, our empirical results suggest that the positive association between R&D investment levels and excess returns is more likely to result from failure to control adequately for risk than from mispricing. On the other hand, our results do not rule out the possibility of a second source of excess returns that are due to mispricing and that are associated with changes in the level of R&D investment.     

Should smart investors buy funds with high past returns?

We fully characterize the equilibria in a gme between a fundmanager of unknown ability who control the riskiness of hisportfolio and investors who only observe realized returns. Wederive two types of equilibria. The first one is such that (i)investors invest in the fund if the realized return falls withinsome interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high, (ii) agood manager picks a portfolio of minimal riskiness and (iii)a bad manager picks a portfolio with higher risk, "gambling"on a lucky outcome. The second type of equilibrium is more traditional:(i) investors invest in the fund if the observed return is largerthan some threshold, and (ii) good and bad managers choose thesame risk level.