Managing real exchange rate for economic growth: Empirical evidences from developing countries

Abstract

This article analyses macroeconomic policies capable of influencing the long-run real exchange rate (RER). In this vein, it identifies economic policy tools that can devalue RER, covering a theoretical issue neglected by the economic literature, which argues that competitive exchange rate enhances growth. After discussing the “Trilemma,” we identify those variables that could affect RER without constraining monetary policy or exchange rate regime choice. In what follows, we model the probability of achieving an undervalued (small or large) RER for a sample of 14 developing countries from 1980 to 2010 (30?years) by applying econometric techniques for discrete choice and censored data. Afterwards, we compare the results for Latin American nations with Asian ones. They suggest that competitive exchange rate requires different approaches depending on the region. Moreover, Latin American countries need to take on additional policies so that interventions in the foreign exchange market become effective.     

Real exchange rate misalignments

This paper investigates episodes of real exchange rate appreciations and depreciations for a sample of 85 countries from 1960 to 1998. A Markov Switching Model is used to characterize real exchange rate misalignment series as stochastic autoregressive processes governed by two states corresponding to different means and variances. Our main findings are: first, some countries present no evidence of distinct misalignment regimes; second, for some countries there is no RER misalignment in one of the regimes; and, third, for the countries with two misalignment regimes, the appreciated regime has higher persistence than the depreciated one.     

Inferential Implications of Over‐Parametrization: A Case Study in Incomplete Categorical Data

In the context of either Bayesian or classical sensitivity analyses of over‐parametrized models for incomplete categorical data, it is well known that prior‐dependence on posterior inferences of nonidentifiable parameters or that too parsimonious over‐parametrized models may lead to erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, some authors either pay no attention to which parameters are nonidentifiable or do not appropriately account for possible prior‐dependence. We review the literature on this topic and consider simple examples to emphasize that in both inferential frameworks, the subjective components can influence results in nontrivial ways, irrespectively of the sample size. Specifically, we show that prior distributions commonly regarded as slightly informative or noninformative may actually be too informative for nonidentifiable parameters, and that the choice of over‐parametrized models may drastically impact the results, suggesting that a careful examination of their effects should be considered before drawing conclusions.     

INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

This paper examines the main causes of the acceleration of inflation in Yugoslavia during the 1980s and Yugoslavia's last attempt at stabilization in 1990. Yugoslav inflation shares common elements with inflation in other highly indebted countries despite appearances otherwise. Like these other countries, Yugoslavia failed to make internal adjustments to match a large transfer to resources abroad, resulting in a large internal redistribution to real resources through inflation. However, in Yugoslavia these internal conditions were not transparent. Instead of an open fiscal deficit, complex interactions took place among enterprises, banks, and the central bank, involving the central bank's absorption and servicing of a large stock of foreign exchange liabilities.
Failure to correct hidden losses in the economy was the main reason that various stabilization attempts failed during the 1980s. The 1990 program was the first to recognize the existence of those hidden losses and the need for a fiscal correction. The program succeeded in eliminating the central bank's own deficit and was initially successful infighting inflation, but pressures to finance enterprises and avoid a liquidity crisis in the financial system resulted in a relaxation of monetary policy and a revival of inflation. Seen from this angle, the Yugoslav program of 1990 resembles other heterodox programs that had initial success in reducing inflation but later faltered because of an insufficient fiscal adjustment.