Stock Market Reactions to SFAS No. 96: Evidence from Early Bank Adopters

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 96, “Accounting for Income Taxes,” issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in December 1987 changed accounting for income tax recognition and accrual. The original deadline for implementation of SFAS No. 96 was December 15, 1988, and earlier adoption was encouraged. This study examines empirically the stock price impact of four pertinent announcement dates regarding SFAS No. 96 for 19 banks that adopted the statement in late 1987 and early 1988. Our results suggest that these early bank adopters have different characteristics from other banks that cause them to benefit from the changes in accounting for deferred taxes and explain their voluntary adoption of the standard.     

Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks

Consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concern about the survival of small banks, particularly as it relates to the availability of credit to small businesses. However, if small banks have an advantage in processing credit information, compared to large banks, they should continue to survive in a competitive environment. We evaluate risk-adjusted commercial loan yields (gross yields less net charge-offs and the risk-free rate of return) at small and large banks for the period of 1996 through 2001. Our primary finding is that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than larger banks. This result suggests that small banks make better choices from the available small business loans and is consistent with the notion that these banks have an information advantage in evaluating credit.     

Rethinking the role of NCBs in the EMU

Five years after the introduction of unified monetary policy in the EMU, some member countries are wondering whether they have ceded too much of their policy-making powers. The fact that National Central Banks no longer carry out sizable expansionary open market or foreign exchange market operations suggests that they face substantially reduced abilities to set economic policy.This paper demonstrates that, in fact, very little power has been yielded: on the fiscal front, the force of such policy initiatives is enhanced by the fixity of the exchange rate. On the monetary front, we show that there is an observational equivalence between all Central Bank actions under fixed exchange rates. This implies that the authorities retain the same amount of policy flexibility as before. So long as they use an alternative form of policy initiative, carrying out what previously would have been characterized as sterilized foreign exchange market operations, their ability to influence the macro performance of their economy is undiminished.     

WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLES

The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided.     

CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.